On 15 Jun 2016, at 18:25, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 7:09 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 14 Jun 2016, at 16:19, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 13/06/2016 7:12 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that
mathematics
is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by
evolution,
just
like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other
functions.
Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics
only
exists as instantiated in brains.
It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that
Cooper, and
many
contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this
assumption
put
the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made
it. They
don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.
That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps
the
mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard.
Everybody
starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and providing an
evolution
based account of the development of mind and minds development of
arithmetic
is just as legitimate as starting with arithmetic and trying to
derive
matter and mind.
Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less
account for
matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until
one
specifies precisely what form of computation.
It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
hypothesis.
I would express this differently. Only persons are conscious (and
no problem
seeing a person already in a spider). But persons are the result of
comples
dynamical state relative to the state of some others universal
machines
(from the physical laws to your parents, the boss, etc.).
The first person is not associated to one computation, but to an
infinity of
them, emerging from a non trivial structure (eventually the sigma_1
sentences (with or without oracle) structured by the modalities of
self-reference (which exists and are variate due to incompleteness).
Computation is still a third person describable object (assuming
Church-Turing). But consciousness is a first person thing, and no
machine
can equate it with any thing third person describable.
I think you know this and made a periphrase, this is for the possible
benefits of others.
Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
consciousness than physicalism.
David Nyman thought something like this, but I think he saw the flaw.
Eventually, the criteria we could use is the conceptually simplicity
of the base theory.
My point to Bruce is that insists on
wanting things that are not compatible with each other -- from my
amateurish understanding of theoretical physics, this happens in other
areas of science: you can choose weirdness A or weirdness B, but you
cannot get rid of all weirdness.
Yes. Maudlin, in its book on quantum inseparability use the
expression: choose your favorite poison.
In my view you cannot want "scientific realism" and also ignore that
the brain really looks like a computer.
Certainly, at some level of decription. It looks like that. It is a
reasonable bet.
But then you cannot ignore the
consequences of the UDA. All this independently of what consciousness
is, I would say. But maybe you also disagree.
The 3p-truth is independent of consciousness, but it is consciousness
which makes the person say: "oh I am in Washington and not in Moscow".
It the receptacle of the experience, or the measurement result, but it
is also the "unconscious" bet that there is something true behind that
measurement: the nuance are made possible by the fact that []p & p
differ from []p & <>t & p. The first is knowledge, the second is more
close to consciousness. I guess I need to explain more.
And why that form of
computation rather than some other? I don't see that
computationalism
actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are
every
bit
as difficult as the problems one started with.
But computationalism is the default position of modern science.
I agree. Computationalism is almost accepting that brains does not
work by
magic (infinities, substancial angel).
The
brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
appeal to a soul and so on.
It appeal to some non computable things, without ever making it
precise.
And after Gödel+Turing (say), we know that machines are already
confronted
to the non computable, even just by looking at themselves.
I think that is why Diderot define rationalism by Descartes'
mechanism.
Non-mechanism is like substituting ignorance for knowledge and
forgetting to
add the interrogation mark. But, the more we study
computationalism, the
more also we will understand the shape of possible non
computationalist
theories, end eventually we can expect to see what match better the
facts.
I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve
anything". It
is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical
observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry,
computer
science.
Yes, and it is a lantern where we can search the keys. In particular
computationalism, that is Digital (Descarte's) Mechanism, thank to
Church
Thesis, makes the field purely mathematical.
At least with scientific
realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's
experience:
i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.
Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But
Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that
computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective
external
world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other.
I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness
remains
a mystery in Bruno's model.
In deeply disagree on this, and this means you have to work a bit
more.
Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by
(re)defining
computationalism as the assumption that there is a level of
description of
myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged through a
functional
substitution made at that level.
Then that consciousness appears to be a differentiating flux of
possibilities starting from any relative universal state (relative
to either
some other universal number, or from the universal base (here RA).
In UDA, to get the "reversal" physics/arithmetic, you need not more
than AI
and Everett notion: the personal memory (the personal diary).
But when we translate this in arithmetic, the first person is
defined by
the Theaetetus's idea of linking the self-representation with the
truth. We
can do that easily mathematically, because we restrict ourself to
the sound
machine by construction. But no machine can know they are sound,
nor even
really define what that means for them. The result is that the
first person
knowledge ([]p & p) is not definable, nor is the first person
sensation ([]p
& <>t & p, p sigma_1). This explains why the soul is so elusive a
notion,
and consciousness so obvious (close to <>t v t) from the machine
first
person view, yet entirely not describable in arithmetical term. But
machine
can try approximation, and as long as they don't pretend to get it,
they can
progress.
I do have to work more to fully understand some of your more
"advanced" :) ideas, but even from what you say above, this is my
impression: you have a great theory for why we cannot explain
consciousness, but you still do not explain it.
But if I explain it, after explaining that it is not explainable, I
will get inconsistent!
Same with God. Machine's theologies and psychologies are negative
theologies and psychologies: those things are simply not reducible in
words like a tootache, or the pleasure you can have when listening to
music.
All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially
correct is
between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*.
They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb
[]([]p ->
p)-> []p (modesty).
Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the
work:
The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon
reflexion.
God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation.
The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and
necessitation, and
thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not
educate it
well, it might become a tyrant.
I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which
start
tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :)
Ok :)
Good :)
Bruno
I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with
all science we can't choose, just check for correctness.
That is the best we can hope.
In all fields.
Freedom of religion (laicity) is not freedom of teaching the kids
invalid
inference rules.
I really urge people to read the following book:
Daniel J. Cohen, 2007, Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and
Victorian
Faith, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
It explains convingly how modern mathematical logic started from
theological
motivation, with Peirce (Benjamin, the father of Charles Sanders
Peirce),
Boole, De Morgan, Carroll (!), etc. The goal was notably to
introduce more
rigors, and concerned mainly Unitarians wanting to take distance
from the
more Dogmatic conventional Trinitarians. Ironically, the theology
of the
universal machine is more trinitarian than unitarian, well it is 4
+ 4 *
infinity-arian, somehow.
That book explains how the goal of making mathematics accepted as
profession
made the mathematicians starting to hide and eventually deny the
theological
motivation. No doubt that was good for making mathematics into a
profession,
but why not starting professionalizing theology, or at least its
professionalizable part?
Making a science "illegal", and you give the "market" to the
"charlatan",
like making a medication illegal gives the markets to the criminals.
And now a tip to get closer to God: avoid all tips to get closer to
God.
(grin)
I have to go. I will be busy for a few days.
Best
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-
list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
