On 6/16/2016 12:30 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 1:32 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
consciousness than physicalism.
But does it make it any less?
Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism
would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I
just argued with Bruce)
You were arguing under the assumption that functionalism is false and I
think that is absurd. Functionalism is almost certainly true, the
problem is identifying all the essential functions.
Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help
of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That is
more than physicalism can do at the moment.
I don't think Bruno explains anymore than physicalism. In fact
evolution explains why we don't even know about the functioning of our
brains; something that is possible under both physicalism and Bruno's
theory. Bruno's theory only explains that there are some things about
our thinking that we cannot prove/believe/infer (Bruno seems to trade on
equivocation of "B"). We cannot know if we are consistent for example.
But physicalism, and evolution, easily explain that we are probably NOT
consistent - and it doesn't mean that we prove everything because we
don't make all possible inferences. Our experiences are finite.
Brent
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