On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 1:32 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the >> extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about >> consciousness than physicalism. > > > But does it make it any less?
Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I just argued with Bruce) Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That is more than physicalism can do at the moment. Telmo. > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
