On 16 Jun 2016, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 6/16/2016 12:30 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 1:32 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/15/2016 9:25 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the
extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about
consciousness than physicalism.
But does it make it any less?
Well... I would argue that individual consciousness + physicalism
would require non fungible matter, which seems absurd to me. (as I
just argued with Bruce)
You were arguing under the assumption that functionalism is false
and I think that is absurd. Functionalism is almost certainly true,
the problem is identifying all the essential functions.
In Putnam's functionalism, the function are the Turing computable (or
semi-computable) functions. It is a form of computationalism, except
it is fuzzy about the substitution level, which seems to be
presupposed rater high, in the manner of the neurophilosophers.
Other form of functionalism are too much fuzzy, at least as far as I
know.
Then I am convinced at least of this: under comp, Bruno with the help
of Gödel can explain why consciousness looks mysterious to us. That
is
more than physicalism can do at the moment.
I don't think Bruno explains anymore than physicalism.
I explain why physicalism cannot work.
In fact evolution explains why we don't even know about the
functioning of our brains; something that is possible under both
physicalism and Bruno's theory.
Locally. But evolution must be extended to the non physical origin of
the physical laws, which is precisely what computer science or
arithmetic provide.
Physicalism rarely address the mind-body problem, and assumes trivial
1-1 link between first person experience and third person description
of some realities. That does simply not work, and cannot work, as I
have explained cf UDA to not mention it).
Bruno's theory only explains that there are some things about our
thinking that we cannot prove/believe/infer (Bruno seems to trade on
equivocation of "B").
The theory works for any creature which is finitely third person
describable, does not use magic, and believe in PA axioms. To refute
the consequence of computationalism on the basis that I assume the
observers to be arithmetically sound would be like refuting Einstein
of even Galilee physical theory, because they assume similar things on
the observers involved in the thought experience. "Einstein, your
theory is not convincing because you assume the guy in the train to be
sober, but why would it be sober?"
We cannot know if we are consistent for example.
OK.
But physicalism, and evolution, easily explain that we are probably
NOT consistent - and it doesn't mean that we prove everything
because we don't make all possible inferences.
That alludes to the non-monotonic layers that plays a crucial role in
speeding learning and natural languages. But that is another topic. We
have to "meta-bet" that we are consistent when we do theology, because
doing theology "scientifically" consists at doubting systematically on
all Gods, or if you prefer, on all realities that we feel existing
beyond oneself.
Here, I specifically do not allow the numbers that I interview in
arithmetic to use second order logic so that consistency is equivalent
"the God/Reality/Model relative to this Number" exists (by Post-Gödel-
Henkin *completeness* theorem of elementary (0th and 1th order) logic).
It is sad that logicians use the term Model for a (mathematical notion
of) semantic of a (mathematical notion of) theory, as physicists and
others use the term model for mainly what logician called theories
(formal or informal). It does not help in the dialog of deaf.
Physicalism invoke a God in its explanation of the links between the
third person description and the first person experience, and that use
of God just becomes a God-of-the-Gap metaphysical escape when you
assume the digital (Church-Turing-Post-Kleene) version of mechanism.
Our experiences are finite.
And thus confronted all the time to the many infinities. But we can
manage, sometimes. Even in arithmetic, it makes some sense to say that
the sum of all natural numbers is ... -1/12. Computations like series
can converge and can diverge in infinitely many different sense/model.
Universal (Löbian) Machines know that the more they know, the bigger
is their ignorance spectrum.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
