On 17 Jun 2016, at 20:47, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 1:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Evolution provides a perfectly comprehensible route to
consciousness,
> To the easy consciousness problem. You don't seem aware of
the hard problem, like called it.
The reason the hard problem hasn't been solved is that nobody,
least of all Chalmers, has been able to clearly state exactly what
the hard problem is. What mystery about consciousness has Darwin and
the assumption that the chain of "what caused that?" questions is
not infinite failed to solve?
The "hard problem" is only the known most difficult part of the mind
body problem. Chalmers' enunciation of the problem assumes a physical
universe (= making it primitive). So it hides the hard part of the
matter problem.
With computationalisme, the problem get mathematical and is a
generalization of the problem solved by the logicians about the
relation between a theory (a finitely 3p describable object) and its
semantics which is very often not axiomatizable or 3p finitely
describable.
The explanation of consciousness is akin to the explanation why we
need second order logic or analysis, and why to understand the finite
things we need to introduce infinities.
I do think that when we assume mechanism, Gödel-Löb-Solovay is the
best we can hope for an explanation, especially if we understand that
the needed (for defining the first person knowable, observable,
sensitive) intensional variants makes sense (thanks to incompleteness).
> Matter almost certainly is fungible,
Yes, any atom will do because one atom is like another, but you
can't make a calculation without atoms.
In your theory which has been refuted up to your step-3 confusion.
Calculation have been defined mathematically, and shown to exist in
elementary arithmetic. You seem to introduce an invisible God (matter,
the atoms, ...) to decide what is real or not. That's an easy old
trick, which is, well, not valid in science.
Like atoms wheat is fungible and generic, but that doesn't mean you
can make bread without wheat.
Of course we can, if by bread you mean the whole set of first person
quale associated to it. If your brain is emulable by a computer, there
are infinitely many numbers relation making believe infinitely many
John Clark's sub-substitution level John Clark's relevant computations
in which those John Clark attempt to reifer the bread.
The antic understood already well the non validity of such argument.
> but there might be a problem with scaling a computer model
for individual neurons, or small groups of neurons, up to the size
of the full brain.
Enormous technological problems would need to be overcome for a
full brain emulation, but it would entail no scientific or
philosophical problems.
Of course it does. The emulation does not solve the mind-body problem,
it makes it only more interesting, and mathematical.
Unlike faster than light spaceships no new laws of physics would be
required.
But the laws must be derived from the mind, alias the number
relations. (I assume digital mechanism all along).
> You know, all I say is that if you use evolution to explain
consciousness, then you already use mechanism
Yes, and you use mechanism every time you decide to scratch your
nose.
No. I scratched my nose a long time before I assumed mechanism. In the
context, by "use" I meant "assume. Some Gorilla scratch their nose,
and there is no evidence they assume Mechanism. Now, a cousin of the
Gorilla made a theory "Evolution". It is generally accepted that it
presupposes mechanism, and molecular biology confirmed (which proves
nothing, but add evidence to Evolution). Now evolution does not
explain consciousness, because if consciousness can be explained in
the third person way, it has no more need to exist from the pure
evolutionnary viewpoint. It suggest already that consciousness might
logically precede appearance of matter, like it has to once we assume
digital mechanism.
> but then, and that is what I show, you need to pursue the
evolution idea up to the origin of the physical laws,
No, if you're just interested in consciousness then you don't need
to do that anymore than a good neurologists needs to be a master of
string theory, he can treat molecules and probably even entire
neurons as black boxes and work up from there. Neurons are made of
molecules and molecules are made of atoms and atoms are made of
protons and protons are (possibly) made of strings, and yes maybe
strings are in some sense made of numbers.
Even if strings are made of numbers, digital mechanism has to be
false. It is just that "material object" does not exist per se. They
are no more made of matter than a dream of a material object. It is
relational sharable first person plural appearances, where the first
person is the canonical person attached to any Turing complete
numbers. Altough a large part of this works for sub-universal system,
and technically some nuances should be added, just read the papers for
more details, and problems.
Maybe. But none of that matters, if you understand why some
arrangements of neurons produce intelligent behavior and why other
arrangements do not then you understand consciousness, or at least
as well as you're ever going to.
Which means never, but we can understand more and more around a fixed
point which just can name or explained itself for pure arithmetical
and logical reason.
And the whole point is not that this theory is true, only that it is
testable (and up to now confirmed, thanks to Gödel and QM).
Bruno
John K Clark
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