On 25 Jun 2016, at 09:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 25/06/2016 1:16 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:
If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the
universe,
I do not assume a universe.
We don't have to assume it -- we observe it, and we experience it
directly,
That argument has already been refuted by the antic chinese, indians
and greeks.
John Clarck used it just recently: it is the knock on the table
argument.
All what I see are physicists measuring numbers, and inferring
relation between those numbers. To predict what I will see using those
relations assumes also the non existence of too much Boltzman brains,
and a mysterious selection from the sigma_ arithmetical reality.
so it is as real as our conscious state -- consciousness supervenes
on the physical brain, after all.
Yes, but if it is through digitalizable relations, the brain get
infinitely many locally exact implementation in arithmetic, and you
have to explain how your matter do the selection, without using a non
Turing emulable element preventing the "yes" doctor to be genuine.
You can ascribe a mind to a person through its brain, but the person
itself cannot ascribe its mind to any brain/computation among an
infinity of one. But the math suggests everything goes well, the white
rabbit will phase out even near death plausibly.
that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is
itself seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are
necessarily in superposition,
Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD,
but the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all
computations.
I see, so you do believe in a collapse model, after all.
Of course not, except in the phenomenological way. The guy opening the
door and seeing itself that he is in Moscow, will believe in some
collapse to, and information generation (one bit).
You collapse the unobserved part of the multiverse to unreality, to
nothing.
Of course not. Please study the work. I only deduce propositions from
propositions. I have sometimes to simplify myself to explain to non
mathematicians, but it is just unfair to jump on unreasonable reading
of what is done here.
How do you ensure that I am in the same world as you are?
The price for this, with computationalism, is that the physical is not
third person, but first person plural: the superposition are linearly
contagious. We share the histories with whom we interact.
I don't know the truth, Bruce, I just make my hypotheses clear and
deduce from them. The discovery of the universal machine and its
relation to mathematical logic plays the key role. You might need to
dig more to get the beauty, before trying to guess if it is true or
not. In fact comp is like the quantum in that (Bohr) regard: the more
you study it, the less you believe it. It is normal as G* minus G,
where most things happens, is the range of the true, for the machine,
but unbelievable, by the machine.
I did not the hard job, the main job has been done by Gödel, Löb,
Solovay, and many others.
Bruno
and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics
from that of the world we inhabit.
If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world.
But that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist. At
some point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by "world".
That term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and no more
obvious empirically after QM.
I have explained what I mean by "world" several times. I mean a
physical entity, describable by physical laws, and closed to
interaction with other such entities. These are the "worlds" that
arise from Everettian QM, and the other bubble universes in eternal
inflation.
So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of
FPI is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.
Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes
a universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC + yes-
doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more
complex measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we
just listen to what the machines already say about this, we get (a)
quantum logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of
Gleason theorem.
I think the problem you face is proving that the computations
characteristic of worlds with arbitrarily different constants and
laws do not also pass through our consciousness, leading to an
incoherent mess. Statistics over computations is not a clean way to
separate things out. Any probability other than one will lead to
white rabbits.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
