On 24 Jun 2016, at 21:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 6/24/2016 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly
different physics.
Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is
only one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant
here: the physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from
the physics on earth).
In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example,
would predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own
fundamental constants and possibly different physical laws. In
fact, this is a currently popular way to explain why the natural
constants have their observed values: all values are realized in
some world or another, and anthropic arguments are used to explain
why we are in a world that is consistent with our existence.
(Another form of FPI perhaps, except that this theory requires
that there are worlds in which life, and consciousness, are not
possible. It does not seem that computationalism would allow the
existence of such worlds.)
See Vic Stenger for a critic of such anthropic argument.
Then computationalism allows, well all computations, most of which
will not been associated with any relative Löbian self-reference,
and so will not have consciousness.
"Associated with" is very vague.
?
I allude to the association used when we say "yes" to the Doctor, or
when we attribute a presence of a conscious person by its
manifestation through her body.
Then the point will be that the person itself, once she is willing to
assume she will survive well, should believe, if enough rational, that
she cannot associate her consciousness to one body-computation, but
only to an infinity, and the physics she can infer below its
substitution level is a statistics on many computations, something
confirmed by the "MWI", or just QM without collapse.
As I understand it Lobianity is a potential for self-reference.
Like a relative universal number is a potential for having and
manifesting a personal experience. Having a state is a potential for
having a next state if we are lucky enough to be in presence of some
universal numbers, which are those responsible for number state to
transit toward another number state.
So is it a property of an algorithm, or class of algorithms,
It is an (intensional) property of the members of a very large class
of relative numbers (numbers relations). Intuitively, it is when the
numbers relation are so rich that the universal numbers begin to
infer the gap between G and G*. They grasp they understand nothing,
but can try theories.
In our own most plausible histories, I could argue that this has
appeared on this planet with the rise of (proto) bacteria.
the UD is executing or is it a property of some sequences of
execution?
I think you should reread UDA, and perhaps, for the step seven, study
a good on logic and computability.
Löbianity is the property of a belief system, and mathematically they
are those which propositional logic obeys G and G*.
It is a not easy at all exercise to show that universal self-
referentially correct machine/system/numbers believing in classical
logic and having enough induction power (RA fails, PA and ZF do not,
nor any of their sound, or just consistent, extensions.
But consciousness is lived on the side of []p & p, making it non
definable by the relative numbers, and physics is even more difficult,
because it asks for some world/reality, which is the <>t bet (provably
so for first order logic, but also higher order effective (machine,
relative number) extension (indeed, in arithmetic, even most
arithmetical Gods (a variant or Turing oracle, the pi_i complete sets,
or the sigma_i complete sets with i > 1, are still Löbian.
Do you think human thought is self-referential? ...all the time?
No. Only on the human referential problems.
To go on Mars, is a self-referential goal, but it involves subproblem,
like studying the composition of Mars, which is not self-referential
in nature, locally, unless you are interested in the nature of the
composition of Mars, which would lead the the self-reference of the
universal numbers, if my reasoning is valid.
Keep in mind I am just giving a problem, and the universal machine's
solution.
Now the physical is phenomenological so a physical reality without
consciousness makes sense only as a possibility relatively to us,
but not a concrete things ever accessible in any sense.
This can leads to interesting question and problem, but keep in
mind that the physical requires only the consciousness of the "rich
enough" relative numbers, not human consciousness.
Physics is a sum on all worlds.
What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or
only all worlds consistent with our existence?
I meant all computations going through my actual state.
What does it mean "may actual state"? Is that a class of states of
the TM tape?
In the Turing formalism, you can see it, implement it, in that way.
But it is a set of solution of some Diophantine degree four polynomial
equation too.
(Then technically I can differentiate the consistent extensions,
the true extensions, and the justifiable, by using incompleteness,
cf []p, []p & p, []p & <>t & p).
Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and
entirely determined by the theology of the universal machine. The
pther worlds are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening
the door and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the
electron and seeing it up.
If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the
universe,
I do not assume a universe.
that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is
itself seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are
necessarily in superposition,
Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD,
but the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all
computations.
and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics
from that of the world we inhabit.
If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world.
But that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist.
Materialists consider the physical world to be the best explanation
for our conscious experiences.
Literate people with an atom of interest in ancien or modern
philosophy of mind are aware of the difficulty, which in a nutshell
seems to make consciousness irrelevant. Serious and rational people
get first person eliminativist, but of course, like Dennet's thought
experience illustrate to, "where am I" and "who am I" get uneasy when
duplicated.
It explains their consistency and regularity without assuming
solipism.
Yes, but only by abstracting away the first person. They assume a form
of super-induction axioms, which just fails when you assume that your
first person can be digitally truncated relatively to your most
probable computational histories.
A computationalist is per se not solipsist, as it will endow
consciousness to all persons realized through all (sigma_1,
semicomputable, partial recursive) relations.
Now, the conscience of the colleagues and other mammals belongs
literally at a different level, as the talk of the correct machine
cannot be lifted at our actual level.
Only though interrogation, with the remind that the saying "yes"
requires an act of faith, so that in particular this cannot be enforced.
Of course the DNA witnesses that nature has already bet on the
digital, but that is different, and still inferred from finite number
of observations.
Materialist says Matter stabilizes well consciousness. With
computationalism, we can see a very complex dreams structure in
arithmetic, and it is an open problem if there is a stabilizer at all.
Yet, interviewing the average good willing Löbian number, we got what
we need (a quantization, a quantum logic).
Primary Matter? It is in your head. It is in the head of all (Löbian)
universal numbers. Well, it should, and the first evidences are that
it does.
Which proves nothing, of course. The point is just that you can have
both materialism and digital mechanism in cognitive science/theology.
Materialism might be true, but it is up to the materialist to provide
an explanation of what is that primary matter, and how it select the
consciousness from all arithmetical histories. Computationalism
illustrates that the use of matter is a God-of-the-gap mistake when
invoke to avoid the mind-body, or the first-person/third-person
relation problem.
Bruno
Brent
At some point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by
"world". That term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and
no more obvious empirically after QM.
So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of
FPI is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.
Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes
a universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC + yes-
doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more
complex measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we
just listen to what the machines already say about this, we get (a)
quantum logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of
Gleason theorem.
Bruno
Bruce
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