On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly
different physics.
Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is
only one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant
here: the physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from
the physics on earth).
In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example,
would predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own
fundamental constants and possibly different physical laws. In fact,
this is a currently popular way to explain why the natural constants
have their observed values: all values are realized in some world
or another, and anthropic arguments are used to explain why we are
in a world that is consistent with our existence. (Another form of
FPI perhaps, except that this theory requires that there are worlds
in which life, and consciousness, are not possible. It does not seem
that computationalism would allow the existence of such worlds.)
See Vic Stenger for a critic of such anthropic argument.
Then computationalism allows, well all computations, most of which
will not been associated with any relative Löbian self-reference, and
so will not have consciousness. Now the physical is phenomenological
so a physical reality without consciousness makes sense only as a
possibility relatively to us, but not a concrete things ever
accessible in any sense.
This can leads to interesting question and problem, but keep in mind
that the physical requires only the consciousness of the "rich enough"
relative numbers, not human consciousness.
Physics is a sum on all worlds.
What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or only
all worlds consistent with our existence?
I meant all computations going through my actual state.
(Then technically I can differentiate the consistent extensions, the
true extensions, and the justifiable, by using incompleteness, cf []p,
[]p & p, []p & <>t & p).
Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and entirely
determined by the theology of the universal machine. The pther
worlds are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening the
door and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the
electron and seeing it up.
If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the
universe,
I do not assume a universe.
that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is itself
seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are necessarily
in superposition,
Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD, but
the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all computations.
and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics
from that of the world we inhabit.
If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world. But
that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist. At some
point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by "world". That
term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and no more obvious
empirically after QM.
So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of FPI
is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.
Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes a
universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC + yes-
doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more complex
measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we just listen
to what the machines already say about this, we get (a) quantum
logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of Gleason theorem.
Bruno
Bruce
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