On 6/24/2016 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly
different physics.
Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is
only one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant
here: the physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from the
physics on earth).
In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example,
would predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own
fundamental constants and possibly different physical laws. In fact,
this is a currently popular way to explain why the natural constants
have their observed values: all values are realized in some world or
another, and anthropic arguments are used to explain why we are in a
world that is consistent with our existence. (Another form of FPI
perhaps, except that this theory requires that there are worlds in
which life, and consciousness, are not possible. It does not seem
that computationalism would allow the existence of such worlds.)
See Vic Stenger for a critic of such anthropic argument.
Then computationalism allows, well all computations, most of which
will not been associated with any relative Löbian self-reference, and
so will not have consciousness.
"Associated with" is very vague. As I understand it Lobianity is a
*/potential/* for self-reference. So is it a property of an algorithm,
or class of algorithms, the UD is executing or is it a property of some
sequences of execution? Do you think human thought is
self-referential? ...all the time?
Now the physical is phenomenological so a physical reality without
consciousness makes sense only as a possibility relatively to us, but
not a concrete things ever accessible in any sense.
This can leads to interesting question and problem, but keep in mind
that the physical requires only the consciousness of the "rich enough"
relative numbers, not human consciousness.
Physics is a sum on all worlds.
What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or only
all worlds consistent with our existence?
I meant all computations going through my actual state.
What does it mean "may actual state"? Is that a class of states of the
TM tape?
(Then technically I can differentiate the consistent extensions, the
true extensions, and the justifiable, by using incompleteness, cf []p,
[]p & p, []p & <>t & p).
Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and entirely
determined by the theology of the universal machine. The pther
worlds are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening the door
and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the electron and
seeing it up.
If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the
universe,
I do not assume a universe.
that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is itself
seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are necessarily
in superposition,
Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD, but
the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all computations.
and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics from
that of the world we inhabit.
If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world. But
that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist.
Materialists consider the physical world to be the best explanation for
our conscious experiences. It explains their consistency and regularity
without assuming solipism.
Brent
At some point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by "world".
That term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and no more
obvious empirically after QM.
So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of FPI
is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.
Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes a
universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC +
yes-doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more
complex measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we just
listen to what the machines already say about this, we get (a) quantum
logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of Gleason theorem.
Bruno
Bruce
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