On Sun, Jul 3, 2016  Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

​>>​
>> ​Computationalism
>> ​ says ​
>> intelligent behavior is caused
>> ​ ​
>> by computations
>> ​, and I'm saying the same thing.​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word "cause" is
> better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.
>

​If there are no computations then there is no intelligent behavior, that's
what computationalism is and it's about as unfuzzy as things get. After
that we can use Darwin to form a corollary, if there is no consciousness
then there is no intelligent behavior.


> ​> ​
> Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing emulable physically.
>

So was I,
​
and so is
​
Computationalism
​.​

​> ​
> Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/translation in
> elementary arithmetic.
>

​Ah but you forgot IHA.​

​> ​
> The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki, you (whoever
> you are)
> ​ [...]
>

​If it's really a well formed question then the personal pronoun "you"
could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't be done without
destroying the value of the thought experiment has to the theory. In a
world with people duplicating machines the question is far too vague to
have an answer, just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of
string?" has no answer. And please, don't start going on and on about
diaries again, two people remember writing that diary; which particular
person and which particular piece of string are you talking about?   ​



> ​> ​
> know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol) with probability one
> that you will feel yourself in a box,
> ​ ​
> and that you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after
> opening the box.
>

​Once more the wrong words are used, THEY (not you) ​
 will
​find themselves (not yourself) in BOXES (not a box) and ​
see one precise city after opening
​THEIR​ (not the)
 box
​,​
​ but that one precise city won't be the same one precise city the other
one saw. So after one precise person had been duplicated and become two
precise people tell me which one of those two precise people you're
interested in and I'll tell you which one precise city was seen by that one
precise person.


> ​> ​
> What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be Moscow or if it
> will be Washington.
>

​Precise?? The only thing precise I can say about the above is that both Moscow
and Washington will be. If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a
more precise question.


> ​>> ​
>> unlike the case with the people duplicating machine stuff, with QM after
>> the experiment is over everybody in the observable universe agrees about
>> what the answer turned out to be. So although right now I don't know the
>> answer to the question "will* I* see that atom decay in the next 30
>> seconds?" it is a perfectly well formed question and 30 seconds from now
>> both I and everybody in the observable universe will agree on what the
>> answer turned out to be. But with the duplicating machine stuff NOBODY will
>> EVER agree on what the answer to the question "what city will *YOU* see
>> in 30 seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds the pronoun will
>> have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a question, it's
>> just gibberish.
>
>
> ​> ​
> That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural* notion.
>

​And if ​
Everett
​ is right then demanding a​ yes or no answer to the question "will
Schrodinger's cat breathe the cyanide poison gas?" would be silly because
it's a ill formed question that has no answer, the same as "how long is a
piece of string?" or "what city will *you* see?".

​> ​
> The superposition of the cat (say) is contagious to the observer and then
> to those the observer will meet.
>

​Some
 observer
​s​
in
​
Everett
​'s Multiverse ​will see a dead cat and some will see a live cat but none
will see a half alive half dead cat.

​>> ​
>> Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno Marchal
>> ​'s theory and would die a quick death without it.​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That is correct.
>

​I know.​



> ​> ​
> But that is why I am able to eliminate them, as eliminating pronouns is
> technically easy for mathematical logicians.
>

​Well, I know of one ​
mathematical logician
​ who can't seem to do without personal pronouns even though this
particular mathematical logician has been asked many many many times to
frame his thought experiment without using them.


> Actually, Theaetetus got the main idea 2000 years ago, but Socrates
> refuted it, and incompleteness shows precisely where Socrates went wrong.
> Of course Socrates could
>  [blah blah]​
>

​To hell with the ancient Greeks! ​
​The ancient Greeks were nitwits.

​> ​
> There are many religions.
>

​And there are many different types of crap, but they're all crap.



> ​> ​
> Aristotle theology
> ​ [...]​
>

​What is the title of this thread? ​



> ​> ​
> the empirical evidences side on the absence of primary matter, and on the
> falsity of physicalism.
>

​For the 42 time I DON'T CARE If MATTER IS PRIMARY! If your interest is
consciousness it's irrelevant, primary or not primary matter is needed.​

 John K Clark

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