On 06 Jul 2016, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a
prediction, not about where JC's two bodies will be reconstituted
(everyone knows that the answer here is "in Washington and in
Moscow" as that is part of the protocol), but about how many cities
all the JC's involved will see
>> And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's
involved will together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see
2 cities; not that predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have
the slightest thing to do with the subjective sense of self.
> I can stop here.
That is probably wise.
Absolutely. I was hoping you would try to renew your argument, but
apparently once you get that there is no problem with the pronouns and
name, you just came back to your oldest strategy (faking a confusion
between 1p and 3p points of view). That strategy has already been
debunked more than one times by many people on this list. It would be
most boring to make another tour.
Of course if any one else has still a problem with the first person
indeterminacy, or other steps of the main argument, or want me to
answer your post in detail, I will happily comply, and they can ask
any question or precision. Yet, at this point, without further
motivation to do so, I will not add anything, we have already gone
through this too much time, and since long you have stopped renewing
your (invalid) arguments.
Bruno
John K Clark
=================================
> personally
How could John Clark see something but not see it personally?
> and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door
of the reconstitution boxes.
Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see
when the doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question
is not well formed and makes no sense.
one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W.
True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is
true. Of course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not
see M" is also true but there is nothing paradoxical about that
because plural object have properties that singular objects do not,
and thanks to the people duplicating machine JC is no longer
singular. Rain drops are not singular either so you can say this
rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is not at point X.
> So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city.
False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities. Rain
fell at point X even if some rain drops did not.
> But now the question was "which one?".
Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the
question being addressed to and what is supposed to be the one
unique correct answer?
> Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city
No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow
and JC will see Washington.
> computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both
respectable Helsinki-JC survivors,
Absolutely true .
> there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences
is favored
Absolutely true.
>leading to the theory which can be sum up by: which city is
unknown
Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the doors of
the reconstitution boxes are opened the light that enters one of
the boxes will turn John K Clark into John Washington Clark and the
light entering the other box will turn John K Clark into John
Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly because we don't
yet have people duplicating machines, but where is the paradox,
where is the unknown?
> the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived
in anyone of those city is P = 1/2.
In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in
both cities John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you
doubt that then go to both cities and ask if the person there is
John Clark and then ask if that person feels alive.
The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment
at all is that after its all over and somebody asked the simple
question "well what ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing,
Washington of Moscow?" there would be no answer, and therefore
assigning a probabilities beforehand like 1/2 is meaningless.
> Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story: no
machine can do that
And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of
reality, only examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in
establishing a language to communicate with other humans.
John K Clark
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