On Tue, Jul 5, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a prediction, not about where > JC's two bodies will be reconstituted (everyone knows that the answer here > is "in Washington and in Moscow" as that is part of the protocol), but > about how many cities all the JC's involved will see > And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's involved will together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see 2 cities; not that predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have the slightest thing to do with the subjective sense of self. > > > personally > > How could John Clark see something but not see it personally? > > > and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door of the > reconstitution boxes. > Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see when the doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question is not well formed and makes no sense. > one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W. > True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is true. Of course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not see M" is also true but there is nothing paradoxical about that because plural object have properties that singular objects do not, and thanks to the people duplicating machine JC is no longer singular. Rain drops are not singular either so you can say this rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is not at point X. > > > So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city. > False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities. Rain fell at point X even if some rain drops did not. > > But now the question was "which one?". > Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the question being addressed to and what is supposed to be the one unique correct answer? > > Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city > No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow and JC will see Washington. > > computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both respectable > Helsinki-JC survivors, > Absolutely true . > > > there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences is favored > Absolutely true. > > > leading to the theory which can be sum up by: which city is unknown > Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened the light that enters one of the boxes will turn John K Clark into John Washington Clark and the light entering the other box will turn John K Clark into John Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly because we don't yet have people duplicating machines, but where is the paradox, where is the unknown? > > the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived in anyone of > those city is P = 1/2. > In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in both cities John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you doubt that then go to both cities and ask if the person there is John Clark and then ask if that person feels alive. The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment at all is that after its all over and somebody asked the simple question "well what ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing, Washington of Moscow?" there would be no answer, and therefore assigning a probabilities beforehand like 1/2 is meaningless. > > Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story: > n > o machine can do that > And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of reality, only examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in establishing a language to communicate with other humans. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
