On 04 Jul 2016, at 00:03, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2016 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>Computationalism says intelligent behavior is
caused by computations, and I'm saying the same thing.
> That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word
"cause" is better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.
If there are no computations then there is no intelligent
behavior, that's what computationalism is and it's about as unfuzzy
as things get. After that we can use Darwin to form a corollary, if
there is no consciousness then there is no intelligent behavior.
> Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing
emulable physically.
So was I, and so is Computationalism.
> Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/
translation in elementary arithmetic.
Ah but you forgot IHA.
> The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki,
you (whoever you are) [...]
If it's really a well formed question then the personal pronoun
"you" could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't be done
without destroying the value of the thought experiment has to the
theory.
Nope. It works very well with "John Clark" instead of "you".
In a world with people duplicating machines the question is far too
vague to have an answer,
Nope. The question is clear, and has a definite answer, once we
distinguish the 1-self- and the 3-self, or the first person pov and
the third person pov.
just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of string?"
has no answer. And please, don't start going on and on about diaries
again, two people remember writing that diary; which particular
person and which particular piece of string are you talking
about?
Both of them of course, given the definition, the hypotheses and the
protocol, that should be obvious.
> know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol) with
probability one that you will feel yourself in a box, and that
you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after opening
the box.
Once more the wrong words are used, THEY (not you) will
find themselves (not yourself) in BOXES (not a box)
OK.
and see one precise city after opening THEIR (not the) box
, but that one precise city won't be the same one precise city
the other one saw.
OK.
So after one precise person had been duplicated and become two
precise people tell me which one of those two precise people you're
interested in
We are interested in both discourse. Both agree with "W v M", and both
are wrong with "W & M".
and I'll tell you which one precise city was seen by that one
precise person.
Keep in mind that we ask for the prediction in Helsinki. By
computationalism we know that we have to verify the prediction for all
first person involved in the reconstitution.
> What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be
Moscow or if it will be Washington.
Precise?? The only thing precise I can say about the above is that
both Moscow and Washington will be.
in the 3p view, that is correct, but we know that both will say "I see
only one city, so the prediction that the guy in Helsinki made "W & M"
is false, from all the 1p-view after the duplication.
If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a more precise question.
What can John Clark predicts about its future first person experience
in Helsinki? Most people can see without problem that "W v M but I do
not which one" win for both reconstitution, and "W & M" fails for
both, and "W" , like "M", win on only 1/2 of the people reconstituted.
Keep in mind that "W" and "M" denotes the first person experiences,
not the 3p description of the localization of the reconstituted bodies.
>> unlike the case with the people duplicating machine stuff,
with QM after the experiment is over everybody in the observable
universe agrees about what the answer turned out to be. So although
right now I don't know the answer to the question "will I see that
atom decay in the next 30 seconds?" it is a perfectly well formed
question and 30 seconds from now both I and everybody in the
observable universe will agree on what the answer turned out to be.
But with the duplicating machine stuff NOBODY will EVER agree on
what the answer to the question "what city will YOU see in 30
seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds the pronoun will
have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a question, it's just
gibberish.
> That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural*
notion.
And if Everett is right then demanding a yes or no answer
to the question "will Schrodinger's cat breathe the cyanide poison
gas?" would be silly because it's a ill formed question that has no
answer, the same as "how long is a piece of string?" or "what city
will you see?".
Or "what city will John Clark see".
But given the protocol and the question, and the digital mechanist
hypothesis, it is trivial to answer when we make the 1-self/3-self
distinction. The answer is "I don't know, and obviously I cannot
know". It is a precise question admitting an indeterminate answer.
> The superposition of the cat (say) is contagious to the
observer and then to those the observer will meet.
Some observers in Everett's Multiverse will see a
dead cat and some will see a live cat but none will see a half alive
half dead cat.
Very good.
>> Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno Marchal's
theory and would die a quick death without it.
> That is correct.
I know.
What a relief!
> But that is why I am able to eliminate them, as eliminating
pronouns is technically easy for mathematical logicians.
Well, I know of one mathematical logician who can't seem to
do without personal pronouns even though this particular
mathematical logician has been asked many many many times to frame
his thought experiment without using them.
Actually, Theaetetus got the main idea 2000 years ago, but Socrates
refuted it, and incompleteness shows precisely where Socrates went
wrong. Of course Socrates could [blah blah]
To hell with the ancient Greeks! The ancient Greeks were
nitwits.
> There are many religions.
And there are many different types of crap, but they're all crap.
> Aristotle theology [...]
What is the title of this thread?
> the empirical evidences side on the absence of primary
matter, and on the falsity of physicalism.
For the 42 time I DON'T CARE If MATTER IS PRIMARY! If your
interest is consciousness it's irrelevant, primary or not primary
matter is needed.
Only because you stop at the third step of the reasoning, by keeping
forgetting that the question is about the possible accessible, from
their state in Helsinki, first person views.
A non computationalist can say that he will die no matter what, but a
computationalist knows (assuming the hypotheses and this protocol)
that he will survive, and that in all his possible accessible first
person views, only one city will be seen in the direct way (by just
opening the door of the reconstitution box, not using video, etc.).
And he knows that any specific prediction will be refuted by 1/2 of
the reconstituted persons, so with the 1p-3p distinction, the answer
is obvious, and is "I cannot predict with certainty which one, but I
can predict with certainty (modulo the hypotheses) that it will be one
among W and M.
It should be obvious, given the definition of 1p and 3p given, that to
verify the prediction, we need to interview all reconstituted persons?
using pronouns or name does not change anything here. It is only by
obliterating the 1p-3p distinction than an element of vagueness
appears. With the 1p-3p-distinction, only an indeterminacy occurs, and
it is isomorphic with throwing a coin (in this very special step 3
protocol of course).
Bruno
John K Clark
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