On 21 Jul 2016, at 19:13, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 02:22:07PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 11:01 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
>
wrote:
I am not convinced that they are the only two possible
outcomes. Remember my skepticism of the Parfit Napoleon thought
experiment.
There may be other theories of personal identity that are
consistent. I
only mention that there are two I am aware of that are. What was your
skepticism regarding Parfit's thought experiment?
Parfit's thought experiment imagined that you could smoothly
interpolate between your own consciousness, and that of Napoleons, by
replacing neurons one at a time.
My criticism was that I could not see that this is obviously
possible. At some
point during the transformation, a percolation threshold is reached,
and you'll lapse into unconsciousness, way before you'll start
thinking you are Napoleon. Another way of expressing this phenomenon
is "the straw that broke the camel's back".
So whilst it is likely that Parfits process can apply between, say W
and M in Bruno's teleporter example, it is far from obvious that it
will work between W and Napoleon as Parfit imagines.
In such a world, there will definitely be multiple persons, who are
more than single observer moments.
I think it is in principle possible (yet non algorithmically) to
transforme a person A into a person B, and this without the person
noticing, by controlled partial amnesia and well ordered anosognosia.
But that does not change anything in the formulation of the First
person (singular and plural) indeterminacy, or it is up to someone
that arithmetic emulates too much "controlled partial amnesia and well
ordered anosognosia" to get stable first person plural "physical
realities".
Computationalism + the acceptance of though experience involving
amnesia is getting toward the idea that there is only one first person
possible. Classical (Theaetus) computationalism gives S4Grz(1), but
from outside in the 3p it is only one modality of the personhood/self-
reference.
John Clark's idea that he remains the one person John Clark, seeing
both cities at once, entails that we-the-humans, or we-the-animals,
or we-the-terrestrial-beings are all the same person already as we are
copies with few modifications at a time if the initial bacteria.
That is nice, or horrific, but does not change the calculus of the
relative experience in the global first person indeterminacy, except
perhaps in enlarging the 'immortality spectrum' when we surf near
inconsistency.
If B and C both remember being A, then they can claim
to being the same person as A, in spite of the fact that B and C are
different people.
What is the problem with that point of view?
Identity relations, by definition, are transitive. If A is
identical to B,
and A is identical to C, then B is identical to C.
Then maybe "personal identity" is not an "identity relation" so
defined.
Indeed.
The teleporter example leads us to conclude that W is H and M is H,
but W is not M.
Absolutely.
In the math part, let us note that the accessibility relation of the
Kripke model of G(1) and S4Grz(1) are transitive, but Z(1*) and X(1*)
are not.
In game theory a strategy A can be better than a strategy B, and a
strategy B better than a strategy C, with the strategy C still better
than strategy A. (the simplest example is provided by the scissors,
stone, paper game).
The FPI, like a measurement in physics needs a notion of immediate
knowledge, which can hardly be a transitive notion. I recall that the
modal equivalent of transitivity is the "4" formula: []p -> [][]p.
Bruno
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
