On 25 Jul 2016, at 00:06, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 24, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> You betray that you are so much Aristotelian that
Aristotle was a nitwit.
> It is *the* very idea of Plato that
Plato was a nitwit.
> Aristotle in a nutshell....
Should remain in his nutshell because there is absolutely
positively nothing Aristotle can contribute to modern science, and
the same thing goes to Plato.
>> So there are an infinite number of Bruno Marchals in
Everett's Many Worlds but all of them are zombies with no
consciousness except for one, the one in this world; THAT AND ONLY
THAT Bruno Marchal has THE FPI.
Of course not! I have no clue how you derive this.
Then I will give you a clue, the clue is "THE".
> They have all the FPI,
They can all have A FPI, but all of them can't have THE FPI.
> You brag not reading the papers,
A proof is not like a novel, in a novel if you get to a bad part
you can keep on reading in the hope that it will get better,
but proofs never get better after errors so only a fool would keep
reading after one is found.
>> Bruno is unable to answer the simple question " After "you"
have been duplicated what one and only one city will "you" end up
seeing, Moscow or Washington?"
> Given that there has been a duplication, we have (in the 3-1
view) two first person views, and to get them, by the definition
given, we need to ask the question to both copies.
So after asking all the questions to everybody you want to ask
questions to and after the "you" duplicating experiment is long over
what one and only city do "you" conclude "you" ended up seeing,
Washington or Moscow? If this question has no answer (and gibberish
has no answer) then it's not a thought experiment, it's a thought
muddle.
> Both says I see only one city
That doesn't answer the question! What one and only one city did
"you" end up seeing? If that question has no answer then stop using
personal pronouns if people duplicating machines are around.
> without having been able to predict which one in advance.
Which one? Before they were duplicated and saw different things
there was only one. Afterwords I would predict that the one that saw
Washington would be the Washington Man and the one that saw Moscow
would be the Moscow Man. What else is there to predict? What else
is there to say?
> So both confirms the FPI.
Both can't have much less confirm THE FPI.
> both agree that they could not predict that answer in advance
It's not just "in advance", even when it's all over nobody knows
what the answer turned out to be because nobody then or now knows
what the hell the question was.
> they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when
opening the door
When the doors were opened was when the 2 diverged, until then it
was one individual with 2 identical brains running in parallel.
Right.
And one of them didn't become the Moscow Man and then saw Moscow,
instead one of them saw Moscow and that experience turned him into
the Moscow Man.
Right.
So which one will become the Moscow Man? The one that will see
Moscow. What more is there to say?
That it confirms the prediction "W v M" made in Helsinki, and that it
refutes the prediction "W & M".
Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) = 1/2.
> they knew in advance that they would get one bit of
information.
So what was that one bit of information do you have after the
experiment that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and
Washington is one is that one bit of new information that you have
now but didn't have before a zero or a one?
The M-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to M (that gives
him one bit of first person information, that it can write in his
personal diary), and likewise the W-man lived the apparent "collapse"
from "W v M" to W, giving him one bit of information too. In the 3p
description, we go from 0 bit to 0 bit, but in the 1p experiences we
go from 0 bit to 1 bit. As both copies witnesses this in their diary,
and as the H-guy can emulate this necessary happening, they both
confirm the FPI.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
