On 27 Jul 2016, at 00:29, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
>> there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is
known after the experiment but not before,
> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view.
Then which one has THE UNIQUE 1-view, the Moscow man or the
Washington man?
Both, from the 1-p views, which is what is asked.
>> but before the experiment the Helsinki Man already knew
that the one that will see Moscow will become the Moscow
man;
> Yes, but he know also that the one in Washington will see
Washington.
Exactly, everybody involved knew everything so nobody was
surprised by any of events after the events that transpired after
duplication so nobody learned anything new.
Wrong, both learns which cities they are in, and both knows that they
could never have guess this. Indeed, the W bet would have been refuted
by the W-guy, and vice versa, and, as they assumes comp, they know
that in advance.
You keep (faking) forgetting to read the diaries.
>>so what exactly is that one new bit of information?
> W for the H-guy feeling being in W.
That's not new information, The Helsinki man already knew that
when the Helsinki man walked into the Helsinki man duplicating
machine the Helsinki man's body would be duplicated.
Excellent.
and the Helsinki man also knew that when the Helsinki man saw
Washington the Helsinki Man would turn into the Washington man.
Brilliant. This shows well the 3-1 symmetry (which is part of the
protocol, of course).
There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was obtained
by anyone about anything,
Wrong. Both are astonished, as they both know what you said above, but
see only one of them, so get that one bit of information.
> M for the H-guy feeling being in M.
That's not new information,
Of course it is. He could not have guesss that in Halsinki. Would he
have guess that and write "M", the W guys woiuld havce served as
counter-examples, given that we interview both copies to get the 1-
view statistics.
The Helsinki man already knew that when the Helsinki man walked into
the Helsinki man duplicating machine the Helsinki man's body would
be duplicated. and the Helsinki man also knew that when the Helsinki
man saw Moscow the Helsinki Man would turn into the Moscow man.
There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was obtained
by anyone about anything,
That is contradicted by both 1-views.
>>> and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".
>> I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was
the "W & M" prediction about?
> About the future first person experience expected by the guy
in Helsinki,
If the guy in Helsinki just walked into a Helsinki guy duplicating
machine then there is no such thing as THE future first person
experience there is only A future first person experience
. I Mean... what is it about the word "duplicated" that confuses
you?
>>> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) =
P(W) = 1/2.
>> OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability
of who seeing what?
> Of seeing W.
Of who seeing W.
The H-guy, which becomes two person in the 3-1 picture, but still only
1 person in any 1p views available with computaionalism and this
protocol.
There is and has always been a 100% probability (not 50%) that the
sight of W will turn the H man into the W man.
> Or of seeing M.
And there is and has always has been a 100% probability (not
50%) that the sight of M will turn the H man into the M
man. And because H has been duplicated there is a 100%
probability of both these things happening.
Let is verify. The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then
the W-guy refutes this, and vice-versa.
>> but Bruno Marchal didn't answer the question,
what was that one bit of information do YOU have after the
experiment that YOU didn't have before?
Please, don't forget that in this duplicating experience, we get two
person views, and thus your question admits two different answers.
If it has two different answers then obviously the personal
pronoun "YOU" is ambiguous in this situation;
Not a iota.
We have agreed that you represent the two copies, in the 3p. Then it
is a matter of simple logic to deduce from this that both will see
only one city, and so we get the FPI.
so unless Bruno Marchal enjoys speaking gibberish Bruno Marchal
should stop using the word "YOU" when dealing with situations where
YOU duplicating machines exist.
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view
pov. It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture. Here you
(fale) missing the 1-3 difference again.
You just do the confusion more and more clearly.
> from the HM, and from the HW guys, they get one bit of
information, that they were not disposing before pushing on the button
That's simply not true. Everybody knew that after pushing the
button the H guy would have 2 bodies, and everybody knew beforehand
that seeing M would turn one of those bodies into the M man and
seeing W would turn the other body into the W man.
Bravo.
And that is exactly what happened, nobody was surprised at anything
and nothing new was learned by anybody.
Obviously this is wrong. The W guy has tto write W in his diary, and
that is something he (the HW-guy) could never have known in advance
(if this is false, give me the perdiction algorithm).
> One said, "goddam, I see only Washington and not Moscow, I
got that one bit of information predicted by computationalism!", and
the other said "goddam, I see only Moscow and not Washington, I got
that one bit of information predicted by computationalism!".
And both would say "Goddamn I got that information long before
my bodies were duplicated and before I'd ever seen Moscow or
Washington, I knew it back when there was only one Helsinki man and
I was him.
If that was true, both would have been able to foresee this and write
W (and M) in Helsinki, but that is pure nonsense, as they cannot
predict one city with two different names. QED.
Stop faking stupidity, you are not good at this.
Bruno
John K Clark
Bruno
John K Clark
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