On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at
the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the
machine can't do that then
computationalism
is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism
can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim
you've proven something about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly,
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all
computations passing through your conscious state, or something
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail,
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' over
such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is still
only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot be
ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such a
duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only be
resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and see
what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so, despite
what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person does not
produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the 3p
perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person,
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is
below or indirectly related conscious experience. This is what makes
you a different person from who you were in the past.
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based on
his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some essence or
soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and hence of his past
experience. If it's independent of experience then it can't be
bifurcated by experience.
Brent
it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness survives in
an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit two physical
bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the computation that
constitutes consciousness, not the physical location, substrate, or
number of copies of that computation.)
Bruce
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