On 28 Jul 2016, at 01:12, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-
view.
>> Then which one has THE UNIQUE 1-view, the
Moscow man or the Washington man?
> Both, from the 1-p views,
How on earth can both have THE 1-p view, or have anything else for
that matter, if that thing is UNIQUE?
Because there are two 3-1 "I", but they don't add to make some super-I
present simultaneously in two cities, unless you add non Turing
emulable telepathy.
So, they will both live a different 1p experience, and as the giy in
Helsinki knew that in advance, "The" unique experience that he *will*
live is just indeterminate. The best prediction is thus "W v M" and
both confirm this when looking in their diaries. In W, the W-guy see
in his diary "W v M", and he sees W, and so get the confirmation.
Similarly in M. All you need is to read the definition of the 1 and 3
views, and do the very simple math.
>> everybody involved Knew everything so nobody was
surprised by any of events after the events that transpired after
duplication so nobody learned anything new.
> Wrong, both learns which cities they are in,
I just saw a black cat.
I have become The Black Cat Seeing Man.
Why am I The Black Cat Seeing Man and not The White Cat Seeing Man?
Because I just saw a black cat.
I just saw Moscow.
I have become the Moscow Seeing Man.
Why am I the Moscow Seeing Man and not the Washington Seeing Man?
Because I just saw Moscow.
Excellent. But in our case, that guy remembers also what he wrote in
Helsinki, and so can confirm "W v M", and refute "W & M", and "M",
etc. same for the M-guy.
> and both knows that they could never have guess this.
This? It's true Neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow Man could
have guessed "this", and they couldn't have guessed anything else
either because before the duplication neither the Washington Man nor
the Moscow man even existed.
That is just utterly ridiculous. You could say that when we throw a
coin, there is no probability of outcome, because the guy having
thrown the coin does not exist.
However the Helsinki Man could most certainly have predicted that
the copy of himself who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and
the copy of himself who saw Washington would become the Washington
Man. What else is there to predict? What is "this"?
The passage from the 3-1 description ("the copy of himself who saw
Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the copy of himself who saw
Washington would become the Washington Man"), to the specific W, or M
experience that the H-guy is now actually living. The point is that
both confirm the "W v M but I don't know which one" written in the
diary.
> The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then the W-
guy refutes this,
Yesterday somebody predicted that today a male would see Moscow.
To which he is specially related, as we have agreed that the M-guy and
the W-guy keep intact their H-guy identity.
I am a male and yet today I don't see Moscow. Therefore the
prediction has been refuted and no male saw Moscow today.
Answering a fuzzy version of the thought experience can hardly bring
clarity to your point.
> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the
1-view pov.
Why on earth not?
Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H-
guy, but now living incompatible first person experience.
> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture
This gets to the very key of the issue! If true then it's not a
people duplicating machine, there is something about consciousness
that no arrangement of atoms can produce
Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.
and computationalism is dead wrong.
Why? On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from
computationalism, and "yes" consciousness is not something produced by
any arrangement of atoms. the arrangement of the atoms is just a way
for that consciousness to manifest itself in some place in the
relative and indexical way.
> The W guy has tto write W in his diary, and that is something
he (the HW-guy) could never have known in advance
Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all
because until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist.
Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and
so you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is
obviously ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of
absurdum.
QED.
Bruno
John K Clark
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