On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, [email protected] >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant >>>> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the >>>> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, >>>> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good >>>> enough >>>> from my pov. AG >>>> >>> >>> >>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure >>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement >>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT >>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>> >>> >>> >>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM >>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future >>> can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With >>> mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I >>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical >>> action (it does not make sense). >>> >>> Ah, you wrote: >>> >>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>> >>> >>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>> >>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It >>> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like >>> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine). >>> >> >> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, >> namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement >> value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in >> the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based >> since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. >> I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its >> statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet >> to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG >> >> >> >> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >> > > *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG* > > >> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >> alive), >> > > *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, > when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * > > > > Then the SWE is wrong. > > You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but > there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency > of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic > theory of mind (mechanism) > > *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG *
> > > *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG* > > > > It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse solves > it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. > I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more operate at > the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for the collapse, > but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that the collapse > is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then > that hallucination is somehow necessary. > > With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of the > physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the mathematician in > arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). > > Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of the > appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we can test > it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, the > only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be completely > explained in any first person convincing way (the so called hard problem, > which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved the "easy > part" (AI)). > > I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I might > believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in philosophy, which > is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a branch of > both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to search > the key around, not more. > > My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation between > machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover and guess. > They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) and > Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) than > the materialist Aristotelians. > > I say this being aware that some scientists still take the Aristotelian > metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just beginning to be able > to formulate the problem (which of Plato or Aristotle is closer to > reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is still a very > recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation > with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results. > > I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you > dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences of > the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis > "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic (both > published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > >> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described by >> the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, >> and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can >> be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the >> linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave >> evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically >> (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their >> measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they will >> always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the >> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >> means something precise). >> >> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible with >> Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is >> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >> >> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the >> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >> >> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs no >> less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the >> meta-background). >> >> The only axiom that I use are the following: >> >> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >> x + 0 = x >> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >> x * 0 = 0 >> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >> >> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >> >> Kxy = x >> Sxyz = xz(yz) >> >> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the >> UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer >> to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >> >> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we >> get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and >> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >> >> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we >> remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness (or >> just first person experience). >> >> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a >> physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body >> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying >> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We >> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >> hypothesis. >> >> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, and >> with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance of >> physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + >> machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works >> (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the >> mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by the >> Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago). >> >> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last >> match. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>>>>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of >>>>>> them. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OK. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played >>>>>> a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>>>>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that >>>>>> would be a crazy question. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual >>>>>> or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>>>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean >>>>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>>>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >>>>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >>>>> consequence. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>>>> some >>>>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without >>>>>> assuming >>>>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >>>>> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe >>>>> the >>>>> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ? >>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave >>>>>> is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions >>>>>> becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special >>>>>> relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear >>>>> DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>>>> leads to non-linearity. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>>>>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SWR = ? >>>>> >>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements which >>>>> are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay >>>>> congress. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between >>>>>> macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive >>>>>> science. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but >>>>> he >>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >>>>> It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> With the collapse. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists >>>>>> applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire >>>>>> universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of >>>>>> problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, >>>>>> and >>>>>> I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>>>>> MWI. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the >>>>>> many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. >>>>>> We >>>>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend >>>>>> to >>>>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of >>>>>> the >>>>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done >>>>>> in >>>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, >>>>> not about dreams. * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>>>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from >>>>> all computational histories. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, >>>>>> when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an >>>>>> earlier >>>>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>>>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't >>>>> need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >>>>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar >>>>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not >>>>> in the original superposition. AG* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, >>>>> and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>>>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in >>>>>> many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal >>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). >>>>>> The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary >>>>>> evolution. >>>>>> But of course that might be false, and is still an open problem in the >>>>>> computationalist theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for >>>>>> linearity and a core symmetrical physical structure. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and >>>>>>>>>>>> Bob have >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), >>>>>>>>>>>> or (-,-') >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality >>>>>>>>>>>> follows from >>>>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that >>>>>>>>>>>> mean >>>>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* >>>>>>>>>>> other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence >>>>>>>>>>> here and >>>>>>>>>>> there and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the >>>>>>>>>>> frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the >>>>>>>>>>> linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, >>>>>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>> computable, in the global third person picture. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of >>>>>>>>>>> 3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic) >>>>>>>>>>> the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely >>>>>>>>>>> epistemic >>>>>>>>>>> (first person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with >>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, or >>>>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted >>>>>>>>>>>> that there >>>>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those >>>>>>>>>>>> are real >>>>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark >>>>>>>>>> above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, your >>>>>>>>>> claim >>>>>>>>>> (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>>>> deny >>>>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of the >>>>>>>>> wf, >>>>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you >>>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction >>>>>>>>>> between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by >>>>>>>>>> appealing to >>>>>>>>>> the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark >>>>>>>>>> and Bruce >>>>>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows >>>>>>>>>> that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the >>>>>>>> MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling >>>>>>>> theorem? >>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is >>>>>>> not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>>>> collapse >>>>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all >>>>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>>>> working >>>>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of >>>>>>> Mechanist >>>>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>>>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for >>>>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in >>>>>>> worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it >>>>>>> is a >>>>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by >>>>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other >>>>>>> worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate >>>>>>> attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. >>>>>>> OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a >>>>>>> cat >>>>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + >>>>>>> looking >>>>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>>>> interact, >>>>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people >>>>>>> believing >>>>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>>>> thing, >>>>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>>>> "many-computations" >>>>>>> in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post >>>>>>> is a bit out of the context of the thread. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You asked in another post what is the FPI. >>>>>>> It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the >>>>>>> subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) >>>>>>> self-duplication. >>>>>>> Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made precise >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that >>>>>>> Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is >>>>>>> conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested >>>>>>> retrospectively >>>>>>> with QM. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> <div style="word >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
