On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, [email protected] >> wrote: >>> >>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant >>> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the >>> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, >>> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough >>> from my pov. AG >>> >> >> >> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement >> problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse >> contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about >> that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames >> Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs >> first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT >> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >> >> >> >> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM >> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future >> can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With >> mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I >> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical >> action (it does not make sense). >> >> Ah, you wrote: >> >> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events >> are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- >> and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >> >> >> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >> >> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It >> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like >> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine). >> > > Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, > namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement > value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in > the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based > since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. > I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its > statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet > to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG > > > > The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >
*Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG* > If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive), > *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG* > we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described by > the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, > and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can > be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the > linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave > evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically > (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their > measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they will > always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the > persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that > means something precise). > > My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible with > Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is > explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you > agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). > > My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive > quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the > computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. > > That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs no > less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the > meta-background). > > The only axiom that I use are the following: > > 0 ≠ (x + 1) > ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y > x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) > x + 0 = x > x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 > x * 0 = 0 > x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x > > Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: > > Kxy = x > Sxyz = xz(yz) > > Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the UD > from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer to > put them in the epistemology of the observers). > > The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we get > physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and matter > provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). > > On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we > remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness (or > just first person experience). > > Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a > physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body > problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying > hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum > mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying > the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We > can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an > infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a > selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist > hypothesis. > > Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, and > with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance of > physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + > machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works > (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the > mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by the > Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago). > > In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last > match. > > Bruno > > > > > Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>>>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of >>>>> them. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a >>>>> slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>>>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that >>>>> would be a crazy question. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual >>>>> or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean >>>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >>>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >>>> consequence. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>>> some >>>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming >>>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >>>> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe the >>>> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> ? >>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is purely >>>> linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave >>>>> is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions >>>>> becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special >>>>> relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear >>>> DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>>> leads to non-linearity. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>>>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>> >>>> >>>> SWR = ? >>>> >>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements which >>>> are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay >>>> congress. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between >>>>> macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive >>>>> science. >>>>> >>>> >>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>> >>>> >>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but >>>> he >>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >>>> It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> With the collapse. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists >>>>> applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire >>>>> universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of >>>>> problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, >>>>> and >>>>> I share a bit that opinion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>>>> MWI. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many >>>>> histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We >>>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend >>>>> to >>>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of >>>>> the >>>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done >>>>> in >>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, >>>> not about dreams. * >>>> >>>> >>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from >>>> all computational histories. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>>> >>>>> >>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when >>>>> inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier >>>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't >>>> need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >>>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar >>>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not >>>> in the original superposition. AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, and >>>> which contradicts the SWE. >>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in many >>>>> exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal uniqueness >>>>> is >>>>> an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). The evidences >>>>> are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary evolution. But of >>>>> course >>>>> that might be false, and is still an open problem in the computationalist >>>>> theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for linearity and a >>>>> core symmetrical physical structure. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and >>>>>>>>>>> Bob have >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or >>>>>>>>>>> (-,-') >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality >>>>>>>>>>> follows from >>>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean >>>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* >>>>>>>>>> other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence >>>>>>>>>> here and >>>>>>>>>> there and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the >>>>>>>>>> frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the >>>>>>>>>> linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, >>>>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>> computable, in the global third person picture. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of 3p >>>>>>>>>> sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>>> arithmetic) the >>>>>>>>>> indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely epistemic >>>>>>>>>> (first >>>>>>>>>> person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, >>>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that >>>>>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those >>>>>>>>>>> are real >>>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark >>>>>>>>> above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission of >>>>>>>>> information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, your >>>>>>>>> claim >>>>>>>>> (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>>> deny >>>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of the >>>>>>>> wf, >>>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you >>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction >>>>>>>>> between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by >>>>>>>>> appealing to >>>>>>>>> the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark and >>>>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows >>>>>>>>> that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the >>>>>>> MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling >>>>>>> theorem? >>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is not >>>>>> an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>>> collapse >>>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all >>>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>>> working >>>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is >>>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of >>>>>> Mechanist >>>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for >>>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in >>>>>> worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it >>>>>> is a >>>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by >>>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, >>>>>> and >>>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>> >>>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>>> >>>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds, >>>>>> and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate attempt to >>>>>> avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. >>>>>> OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of >>>>>> the >>>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a >>>>>> cat >>>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + >>>>>> looking >>>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>>> interact, >>>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people believing >>>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>>> thing, >>>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>>> "many-computations" >>>>>> in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* >>>>>> of >>>>>> "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post >>>>>> is a bit out of the context of the thread. >>>>>> >>>>>> You asked in another post what is the FPI. >>>>>> It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the >>>>>> subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) >>>>>> self-duplication. >>>>>> Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made precise >>>>>> and >>>>>> explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that >>>>>> Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is >>>>>> conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that >>>>>> this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively >>>>>> with QM. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily >>>>>>>>> exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the >>>>>>>>> obligation >>>>>>>>> to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation >>>>>>>>> is no >>>>>>>>> more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite >>>>>>>>> realties, >>>>>>>>> which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more >>>>>>>>> generally. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I will >>>>>> let them to defend their point again, or not. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The question was specifically about some possible remnant of >>>>>>>>>> physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the non >>>>>>>>>> signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical action at a >>>>>>>>>> distance >>>>>>>>>> obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>> violation, >>>>>>>>>> but Bell's argument does not show action at a distance( in any >>>>>>>>>> unique >>>>>>>>>> branch if that exist), in the MWI. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never go >>>>>>>>>> quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set of >>>>>>>>>> space-time events closed for interaction. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Interesting (but out of topic indeed). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the >>>>>>>>>>> paradoxes came >>>>>>>>>>> >>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their >>>>>>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>>>>>> >>> prejudices. >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just >>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>> >> others do -- how does that make your position any better than >>>>>>>>>>> that of >>>>>>>>>>> >> others? >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > No. I subtract axioms. >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+ >>>>>>>>>>> > unintelligible theory of mind) >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>>>> theory of >>>>>>>>>>> > mind) >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>> > of mind) >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
