Re: A question for Bruno

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On 15 Sep 2016, at 19:38, Stephen Paul King wrote:```
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I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds. What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get that plurality. I still suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's theorem could solve this problem, but we may lose Turing completeness. I would happily trade completeness for correctness.
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http://mathoverflow.net/questions/38160/computable-nonstandard-models-for-weak-systems-of-arithemtic/121252

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Tennenbaum theorem does not make us losing Turing-completeness. Quite the contrary, we escape the bound of the computable, which belongs to all intepretation of arithmetic, standard and non standard as well.
```We would loose computationalism, in some sense.

Bruno

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On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
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On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

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On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com > wrote:
```Hi Stathis,

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I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not be. There must be a non-zero probability of transitions within the processes at each level of the tower, something like a 'time' at each.
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Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the definition of supervenience.
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That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the inequality of entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system. Deriving an arrow of time is not just a matter of figuring out how to chain labels in observer moments, we need an actual transition from one state to another in our theory. Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that they could point me to?
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If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental state could be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there is a real world, with real time and an arrow of time, the subjective world is timeless.
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OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and prouvable) sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable.
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Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1 picture. I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the (1p) subjective experience is bounded to get some duration/ subjective-time aspects, like Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other Heracliteans seemed to claim, and even like the universal machine seems to claim ([]p & p, the 1p, leads to a logic of intuitionist time) but salvia succeeded in making me doubt about this. Salvia can be *quite* dissociative.
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Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes subjective sense, but I believe there might be an altered consciousness state where we feel to live the contrary. Coming back from that state is a highly surprising and highly confusing experience. We can memorize only a piece of that coming back.
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Bruno

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Stathis Papaioannou

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