> On 14 Sep 2016, at 11:25 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The >>>> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the >>>> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and >>>> duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must >>>> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their relation >>>> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven. >>>> >>> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process >>> underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged; >>> otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the >>> physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness >>> can be cut up into infinitesimals. >> >> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model. Each thread of >> the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an "observer >> moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference >> by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time". So they make >> the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued. > > That understanding of an "observer moment" appears to undermine the "Yes > Doctor" scenario. The point of YD, it seems to me, is that one can replace > oneself with a computer running some program -- the digital simulation at the > basis of mechanism. Such a simulation, being a single computation, can be > stopped and restarted at will without the observer being conscious of > anything. If consciousness, or "observer moments", are intrinsically made up > of an infinite number of threads, then this is not possible, and YD fails.
The question of whether you should replace your brain with a machine is a starting point, not a conclusion. The conclusion is that if you can, then there are neither physical brims nor physical machines. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
