> On 14 Sep 2016, at 10:13 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent.  The 
>>> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia.  So the 
>>> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and 
>>> duration.  On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must 
>>> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap.  But their relation 
>>> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.
>>> 
>> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process 
>> underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged; 
>> otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the 
>> physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness 
>> can be cut up into infinitesimals.
> 
> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.  Each thread of 
> the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an "observer 
> moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference 
> by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time".  So they make 
> the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.

The starting point of computationalism is that you can replace your brain with 
a machine. If you can, then consciousness supervenes on a physical process of 
the machine. Thought A supervenes on process a and thought B supervenes on 
process B. A and B are unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b 
are changed. A and B are unaffected if there are copies of processes a and b up 
to an infinite number, as long as there is at least one of each. A and B are 
unaffected if a and b are paused and restarted at arbitrary points; we have 
then a1, a2, b1, b2 and A1, A2, B1, B2, but there is no subjective consequence 
to splitting A and B. 

If A and B are the observer moments and they can be rearranged and split up any 
way without changing the stream of subjective experience, then in a sense their 
being rearranged and split up is only meaningful because it can be defined for 
the physical processes on which they supervene. 

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