On 23 Apr 2017, at 23:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> physics as such use mathematics to explain,
Yes, mathematicians are always saying mathematics is a language
and mathematics is the language that best describes physics. But as
members of this list often say the map is not the territory and the
word "car" is not a car, it is a word.
> For it to be primary, physics should not rely on inference
rules.
You say mathematics is primary, but mathematics relies on
inference rules.
Not really. Formal theories, and machines, relies on inference rules,
but the mathematical reality is independent of the formal theories
used to describe it. Even in logic, you can abandon the theories, and
adopt a pure semantical approach (itself formalized or not) in which
there is no inference rule.
In mathematics, like in any domain, we must distinguish the theories,
and what the theories are supposed to talk about.
Gödel's incompleteness has killed not just logicism, but also the
formalist position (not the use of formalism, but the idea that there
is only formalism).
> You can't use an higher level to explain the lower feature,
Explanations require two things, somebody with enough
intelligence to explain something and somebody with enough
intelligence to understand something; and intelligence always
requires matter that obeys the laws of physics. Explanations are a
function of intelligence, the explanation for why a thing exist may
or may not be correct but as far as the thing itself is concerned it
doesn't matter, the thing will continue to exist regardless.
> JC's argument that he has never seen a computation run
without a
computational substrate is silly when assuming comp,
And that is why JC does not assume this muddled thing that Bruno
calls "comp", and like most of Bruno's homemade terms isn't ever
sure what it means.
That is pure name-calling, and as someone just said that is boring,
and actually a good evidence of lack of argument. To be precise, the
definition of computationalism I have given is:
1) far more precise than any other in the literature, where it is
confused with Putnam high level functionalism. In fact
computationalism is Turing-Church functionalism at a substitution
level. It functionalism preceded by a existential quantifier
(Ex(functionalism works at level x).
2) It implies all other form of computationalism, making anything
derived from it very general.
bruno
John K Clark
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