On 23/04/2017 11:10 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer... It's contradictory.
Logic is merely the specification of rules of inference that are truth preserving. One can demonstrate the preservation of truth in simple situations (truth tables, for example) and generalize. So logic is, in fact, derived from our experience of the world, it is not a priori in any sense, and physics is not derived from logic.
Bruce
Le 23 avr. 2017 02:21, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion.Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are abstract, not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the concrete. BruceQuentin Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter, computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a physical notion.That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the computation does not exist absent the computer. It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the basest kind. Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated logical contradiction. Bruce
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