On 23/04/2017 11:06 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Apr 2017, at 09:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 23/04/2017 5:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a
écrit :
On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.
That is solipsism.
No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I
said. It's a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.
And you are a physical being.... If you thereby deny the existence of
the external objective world, that is most certainly solipsism.
Sure. But you can still deny the existence of a primary physical
objective world.
Computationalism admits the existence of an external reality:
arithmetic. And is hardly solipsist given that he accepts the
existence of infinitely many "others" there.
But that begs the ontological question every bit as much as the
assumption of the existence of an external, observer-independent,
physical reality.
Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.
So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your
experiences, then physics is primary --
No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules of
mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is dubious to
make it primary. For it to be primary, physics should not rely on
inference rules. You can't use an higher level to explain the lower
feature, because if in the lower is primary, everything should
reduce to it.
What basis do you have for claiming that the rules of inference are
of a higher level? They are perfectly easily understood as deriving
from experience -- i.e., from our experience of an objective external
world.
You can experience an external world (like a physical reality or an
arithmetical reality), but you cannot experience its "objectiveness".
You need a theory, and the notion of objectiveness is relative to the
choice of the theory.
We an easily obtain intersubjective agreement about the existence of an
external physical world. You seem to want 'direct' experience, and
refuse to admit the possibility of evaluating the experienced evidence
to reach some conclusion. As physicists are well aware, all observation
is theory-laden, but so are 'direct' personal experiences -- they are
just another form of observation.
In fact, where else could they come from? Do you have direct
intuitive access to the higher realms of Platonia? What facility do
you use for this direct intuition? And how do you verify its
reliability? Inference rules, and mathematics, derive fundamentally
from experience, and that is our experience of the physical world.
same ambiguity as above.
Bruno
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