On 24 Apr 2017, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 23/04/2017 11:06 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Apr 2017, at 09:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 23/04/2017 5:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.
That is solipsism.
No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I
said. It's a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.
And you are a physical being.... If you thereby deny the existence
of the external objective world, that is most certainly solipsism.
Sure. But you can still deny the existence of a primary physical
objective world.
Computationalism admits the existence of an external reality:
arithmetic. And is hardly solipsist given that he accepts the
existence of infinitely many "others" there.
But that begs the ontological question every bit as much as the
assumption of the existence of an external, observer-independent,
physical reality.
Not at all. That would beg the question if we were defending the truth
of computationalism. But the point is only is incompatibility with
physicalism.
To just assert computationalism, we need to accept x + 0 = x, and
alike. Then with computationalism, we have all computations realized
in arithmetic, as a theorem.
There are no evidence for a primary physical universe, yet. may be one
day we will have some,---- I work exactly on that, but the first
evidence are more in favor of computationalism.
Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.
So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your
experiences, then physics is primary --
No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules
of mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is
dubious to make it primary. For it to be primary, physics should
not rely on inference rules. You can't use an higher level to
explain the lower feature, because if in the lower is primary,
everything should reduce to it.
What basis do you have for claiming that the rules of inference
are of a higher level? They are perfectly easily understood as
deriving from experience -- i.e., from our experience of an
objective external world.
You can experience an external world (like a physical reality or an
arithmetical reality), but you cannot experience its
"objectiveness". You need a theory, and the notion of objectiveness
is relative to the choice of the theory.
We an easily obtain intersubjective agreement about the existence
of an external physical world. You seem to want 'direct' experience,
and refuse to admit the possibility of evaluating the experienced
evidence to reach some conclusion.
Not at all. We can infer laws from observation, and accept observation
can refute a theory. It is even, before computationalism, the main
reason why I do not believe in a primary physical universe: the
absence of evidences for it.
As physicists are well aware, all observation is theory-laden, but
so are 'direct' personal experiences -- they are just another form
of observation.
I do not accept *any* experience as a definitive evidence, nor do I
accept direct evidence, except for "consciousness here and now", but
that one is not part of the theoretical discourse: it is just an
important data to not hide.
Bruno
In fact, where else could they come from? Do you have direct
intuitive access to the higher realms of Platonia? What facility
do you use for this direct intuition? And how do you verify its
reliability? Inference rules, and mathematics, derive
fundamentally from experience, and that is our experience of the
physical world.
same ambiguity as above.
Bruno
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