Who whole debate is about which is lower and which an which higher. In
my view logic is just rules for manipulating language that preserver an
attribute which we denominate "t" and which we intend to map onto the
correspondence meaning of "true". That's why different logics are
invented when it seems that existing ones don't map quite right.
Brent
On 4/22/2017 6:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer...
It's contradictory.
Le 23 avr. 2017 02:21, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove
and demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent
if only real is physically realised computations... Even the
notion of realised computation proved by definition that
computation is not a physical notion.
Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are
abstract, not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the
concrete.
Bruce
Quentin
Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a
mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything
reduce to matter, computationalism is false by definition,
as computation as such is not a physical notion.
That is just word salad. A description of a physical process
is not, in itself, physical (unless it is written down or
stored physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in
so far as it is an abstract description of what a computer
does. But the computer is physical, and the computation does
not exist absent the computer.
It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the
thesis that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the
assumption of computationalism contradicts physicalism. But
that is logic chopping of the basest kind.
Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is
not, of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then
attempts to argue that the notion of abstract computations
(platonia) renders the physical otiose. There is still no
contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is something
that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction
with his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is
not a demonstrated logical contradiction.
Bruce
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