On 25 Apr 2017, at 06:15, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/24/2017 10:02 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]>
wrote:
I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist,
like chess and insurance and computations. The question was
whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind,
i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction
of something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part
of what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the
relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a
polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction.
I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as a
hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no more
than the natural numbers with + and * this amounts to an ontology
of arithmetic. Platonism be damned, our interest at this point is
merely in seeing where the hypothesis can take us. So,
computationalism leads us to the extension of the UD, which in turn
gives us the digital machine, aka the fully fungible universal
computational device. The reversal then is between role of the
"psychology" of that universal machine and the subset of the trace
of the UD assumed to implement physics.
The UD doesn't have a "psychology".
David did not claim that the UD has a psychology, but was talking
about the psychology of the UM (I guess the Löbian one) executed
(infinitely often) by the UD (in UD*).
Bruno talks about the "beliefs" of a universal theorem prover in
arithmetic...but that's not a UD.
But the UD enacts them all.
And was is "the trace of the UD".
It is the description of the unique computation of all phi_i(j)^s, for
all i, j, s. (the s is the step number of the computation of phi_i(j) ).
To talk of taking a "subset of the trace" sounds to me like handing
waving: We'll make a machine that writes all possible sentences and
then there's a subset that describes the world.
There is no world. nor description of any world. It is enacting of the
computations.
The former is now required to play the role of filter or selector
on behalf of the latter; it's what distinguishes it from the much
more general computational background. Of course that "filtration",
by assumption, essentially equates to the extremely high
probability of that very subset being required to support its own
self-selection.
Are you saying this "subset of the trace" must have a high
probability of existing, or it has, by some measure, a high
probability relative to other stuff not in the trace. If the
latter, and if the measure can be defined, that would be an
interesting result; but when I've asked about this in the past Bruno
has just said it's a hoped for result.
The measure must be given by S4Grz1, Z1*, and X1*. The result is very
modest. It is up to others to progress.
I understand that Bruno wants to take thoughts as fundamental
I want nothing but showing that we can do theology with the modest
scientific attitude. Only fundamentalist believers have a problem with
that.
and the wants to identify thoughts with provable or computable
propositions in arithmetic.
Mechanism does relate consciousness with some computations. Then, we
have to study what a machine can really prove about itself and its
consistent extension. What is proven apply to any correct machine, and
that is all we need to get the quanta and the qualia and respecting
the digital mechanist constraints.
He thinks that the modality of "provable" is somehow a good model of
"believes" or "thinks".
It is the simplest most neutral one. That is behave like a belief is a
consequence of Gödel incompleteness, but is also rather obvious. It is
what a correct machine can prove about itself, assuming its
substitution level is correct (which we know when we build the machine
or look at her in arithmetic).
But even if that were true (I don't think it is) it fails to account
for the physical world which one thinks about and acts in.
Really. That would be interesting, but I am not sure that this has
been shown. On the contrary, it explains both the semantic of parallel
dream/universe, and its quantum formalism. And, unlike physicalism,
explains completely the difference between qualia and quanta, where
physicalists just eliminate the qualia.
Bruno (I have to go, I see you wrote many posts, Brent. Hope you
sleep well).
IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of "universal
point of view" falling to the suitably programmed digital machine.
It from bit really, but without the prior commitment to physics as
the unexplained (aka primitive) assumption. OK?
You don't seem to have even mentioned a contradiction.
Brent
David
He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary
matter"....but what is "primary matter". I've studied physics for
many years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said
to be logically contrary to the assumption that computations can
instantiate a mind...whatever that means.
Brent
On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption
of the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at
least have experience of physical computers, and not of non-
physical computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any
discussion on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In
other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration that
does not just beg the question.
Bruce
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