On 4/28/2017 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Apr 2017, at 18:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it
drives the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do
that? If it does it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work
(because that is done in arithmetic too)
We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction
between physics and arithmetic.
I think you need to be more precise. The contradiction is not between
physics and arithmetic, but between computationalism and physicalism.
But those are not contradictory, they are contrary.
Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital
thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.
Just reread the quote above. Or reread may old posts where I say the
exact contrary of what you say here. If computationalism is true, then
physics cannot be an illusion of digital thought: on the contrary it
has to be precisely a sum on an infinity of digital illusion/histories,
I don't see how "an infinity of digital illusion/histories" can be
"summed" - it sounds more like a poetic metaphor, which is very far from
"precise".
which is hardly emulable by a digital computer, but is the
indeterminate experience on all relative continuations thanks to the
fact that the first person is unaware of the delays made by the UD in
arithmetic.
But thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well you
just don't see how it could be.
Not at all. It *cannot* be. You need magic to single out anything
capable to select the computations better than the indeterminate
experience on all relative continuations.
That sounds like magic to me. What is "the indeterminate experience on
all relative continuations" and how is it "capable to select the
computations"?
When you say "it cannot be" you are already assuming your reductio
argument is correct and that you have selected the right premise to
reject - THEN it follows that it "cannot be".
The problem is not with physics, but with physicalism.
But physicalism (which is what - material is fundamental?) was not a
premise of your reductio.
Brent
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