2017-05-03 21:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > > On 5/3/2017 9:47 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 May 2017 11:18 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/2/2017 2:29 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 May 2017 9:57 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/2/2017 1:09 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 May 2017 7:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital > thought, therefore primary physics is otiose. But thought can't be a > consequence of physics because....well you just don't see how it could be. > > > Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the primary > matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-recoverable. > > > The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't. I don't know > anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what is not UD emulable. > > > But what are your grounds for discriminating which things exist and which > don't? > > > Empiricism. > > > That's a slogan not an explanation. > > > That's right - you asked for grounds. > > > I think you could be more helpful than this. > > > > > > > If anything, it strikes me that the history of human enquiry is rather > conducive to the view that whatever limits we try to impose on "what > exists" are in all likelihood destined soon to be surpassed. > > > Actually it has been the reverse. Relativity places a limit on speed, > quantum mechanics places a limit on measurements, Goedel found a limit on > proofs. Laplace was the last physicist who thought we could predict > everything. We haven't been the center of the universe for a long time. > > > Very selective. What about the string landscape, eternal inflation or for > that matter the CUH? Maybe you'll say that these are as yet unproven > hypotheses, but are you willing to say in principle​ they're barking up the > wrong tree? > > > Except for eternal inflation, they aren't even developed enough to be > hypotheses. I'm willing to bet that they will imply limits on what > exists. Even CUH does that, it implies real numbers and theories that > assume them don't exist. > > > Sure, but my point is that all these ideas lead to a broader ontology than > you seemed to be suggesting: i.e the theoretical recipe for what exists and > what doesn't extends beyond the physics we observe locally. But even comp > doesn't claim that *everything* exists. In fact its ontology is extremely > restrictive. > > > > > > > In any case, I still don't see that you've made a convincing argument for > your "groundless" circular explanations. > > > It's not an argument - it's an observation that that's the way > explanations work. > > > Not all explanations. And in particular not ontological ones. > > > You mean the fundamental elements of a theory - whose existence doesn't > have an explanation. My idea of an explanation is one that brings > understanding - not just stops explaining. > > > So is mine. So is Bruno's. What's your point? > > > An explanation that reaches understanding must end with an ontology that > is already understood. Bruno accepts this. He thinks we understand Peano > arithmetic. I think we only understand it because we refer it to > experience with objects. But the broader point is that you can't just pick > some theory with an ontology and say this theory explains things. The > explanation is no good unless you already understand the theory's > ontology. So explanations of different things bottom out on different > ontologies for different people. This is why supernatural agents were > popular explanations up until a few hundred years ago; agents are > intuitively understood by people because, as social animals, evolution > provided us with intuitions about other people. So it was satisfying to > explain a storm as the cloud-god was angry. Now, some physicists would say > it is explained by the Navier-Stokes equation - but that wouldn't really be > right either. In fact NOAA explains it with some simplified N-S plus some > heuristics. > > > > > > > > For example, based on your remarks above, you implicitly exclude "non > physical" computations from your ontology (not forgetting what you said > about ontology being theory dependent). > > > Not at all. I've never tried to make my "virtuous circle of explanation" > exhaustive. I generally include "mathematics" in it, but just as indicator > for all kinds of abstract, symbolic based systems. > > > A theory explicitly based on a computational ontology includes both > physical and non physical. Of course you could go on to say that a physical > computer could compute anything computable; but in that case we find > ourselves at step 7 of the UDA and the putative physical machine then takes > on the aspect of Bruno's invisible horses. Unless you want to say that the > comp derivation of physics is thereby merely contingently impossible. > > > My reservation about that argument is Bruno argues as if all the UD has to > do is reach some state and it will have instantiated his (or someone's) > consciousness. But then I ask myself, "Consciousness of what?" He thinks > the external world is a kind of shared illusion of an equivalence class of > "consciousness" states. This is like the Boltzmann brain paradox without > the solipism. The reasonable way I can see such an equivalence class > having a non-zero measure is if the physics is computed - not just the > conscious perceptions of physics. Then the physics and consciousness are > not different ontologically, they are just different ways of organizing the > states (like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism). > > > Is this really different from what comp implies? Surely the computation of > the physics and its appearance are indeed two different views of the same > thing - 3p and 1p plural? As we appeared to have agreed​ earlier, at the > point where physical computation and the substantive perception (aka > reality) with which it is entangled emerge in tandem, virtuous explanatory > equilibrium has been attained. But the difference in views is the key. The > former (aka 3p or in my parlance the view from nowhere) is the ontology and > the latter the epistemology it implies. > > > But so far there is nothing in Bruno's theory that makes them "the same > thing" every 1p thread of experience could be unrelated to every other - > there would be no intersubjective agreement (or it would be of measure > zero). I think this is what he calls "the white rabbit" problem. > > > > But this doesn't answer my empirical tequila test. Bruno replied that the > (physical) tequila just interfered with the (physical) perception. But in > that case the tequila would have no affect on mathematical reasoning - but > it does. > > > You lost me. > > > Have a few shots and then find the square root of 69696 in your head. > According to Bruno our physical being is only a way of interacting with > other physical things (like tequila), but for knowledge and beliefs about > numbers the physical is otiose. > > > Nonsense. You appear not to grasp the point that if comp is correct then > the computational mechanisms dominating our experience (including our > experience of mathematics) must those of the physics we typically observe. > > > Depends on what you mean by comp. You seem to engage in the same > equivocation as Bruno. On the one hand it means saying "yes" to the > doctor. On the other hand it means accepting his whole argument from that > purportedly proving that physics is otiose. So then the argument refers to > itself and says if physics is otiose then the physics we observe must be > that predicted by his theory. >
That's not it.. the thing is if *mind* is a computational object, then physics must be explained through computation, computations are not physical object... If physicalness is primary, then there aren't any computation, computations in a physically primary reality are only a "human view" on what is really going on... Again if in this setting and you believe that mind is a sort of computation, imagine we capture your mind with a (though correct) program... then we run it on a different hardware... will it be conscious ? we run it 3x slower than real time ? still conscious ? 10x slower ? ... 10x faster ? (assuming each time we fed it an "external" virtual world inputs at the correct rate) Quentin > So which "comp is correct" do you refer to? > > Hence mathematical intuition or inference must be inextricably entangled > with its local physics (as neurocognition) else comp is false. I think you > systematically confuse Bruno's interview with the machine with an > unattained fully fledged theory appropriate to creatures as psychologically > complex as ourselves. > > > No. I don't accept his theory because it reduces to "If this theory is > correct then it must explain what we observe." To be "fully fledged" one > needs to show that it actually does explain what we observe, i.e. that > tequila interferes with mathematical reasoning. He passes this off as just > solving "the white rabbit" problem, as though it were a minor point; but > without solving that it's a theory that can explain anything, and hence > fails to explain at all. I'm not saying solving the white rabbit problem > is impossible - maybe it can be. Bruno's other claim is that his theory > models the relation of conscious thought and physics. But this also seems > dubious. It models a very idealized consciousness of an omniscient > mathematician who knows everything provable. That's not much like any > consciousness I've ever had - even after a whole bottle of tequila. > > Brent > > At this stage what is demanded is that the toy model explicate otherwise > inexplicable features of its putatively vastly more developed but (by > assumption) analogous counterpart. And of course that it not lead, even at > such an early stage, to brute inconsistencies. > > David > > > > Brent > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
