On 2 May 2017 7:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose. But thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well you just don't see how it could be. Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the primary matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-recoverable. The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't. I don't know anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what is not UD emulable. But what are your grounds for discriminating which things exist and which don't? If anything, it strikes me that the history of human enquiry is rather conducive to the view that whatever limits we try to impose on "what exists" are in all likelihood destined soon to be surpassed. In any case, I still don't see that you've made a convincing argument for your "groundless" circular explanations. For example, based on your remarks above, you implicitly exclude "non physical" computations from your ontology (not forgetting what you said about ontology being theory dependent). A theory explicitly based on a computational ontology includes both physical and non physical. Of course you could go on to say that a physical computer could compute anything computable; but in that case we find ourselves at step 7 of the UDA and the putative physical machine then takes on the aspect of Bruno's invisible horses. Unless you want to say that the comp derivation of physics is thereby merely contingently impossible. David Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
