On 23 Apr 2017, at 13:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 23/04/2017 8:52 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a
computation with physics first, without relying on abstract
mathematical notion.
A computation with physics is what is happening in the computer I am
currently working on. I can describe this in mathematical notation
if you wish, but the process is not the notation. Any process that
takes input and produces output is a computation. All physical
objects do this. And physical objects do not know any mathematics.
You assume that there are primary physical object. That is not an
assumption in physics, but in metaphysics, and it is incompatible with
digital mechanism, for reasons which have already been explained, but
which can be sum up in: what role does the primary character of matter
plays in a physical computation to make it supporting consciousness?
The usual answer (like the one given by Peter Jone), like "to make it
real", is equivalent with "God invocation in an explanation".
Mechanism is simpler. You are right when you say that the process is
not the notation, but the math shows that the process is in the truth
relating the "notations", or the "information" or the numbers. Such
truth are NOT notations, they are arithmetical facts, which are
presupposed to be true in every corner of physics. So, once we have to
assume them, why assuming more, given that it only makes the mind-body
problem unsolvable?
You must understand that we know today that the arithmetical truth is
beyond all system of "notation + effective relation between the
notation".
Bruno
Bruce
Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett"
<[email protected]> a écrit :
On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]>
a écrit :
But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a
physical computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of
the primacy of the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least
have experience of physical computers, and not of non-physical
computers. (Whatever you say to the contrary,
You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion
on it...
All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that
you all claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a
contradiction that does not simply depend on a definition of
computationalism that explicitly states "physicalism is false". In
other words, where is the contradiction? A demonstration that does
not just beg the question.
Bruce
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