On 07 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 5/6/2017 12:59 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 8:08 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic,
according to your theory of consciousness, is independent of
perception and physics. Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed
by arithmetic and so should be independent of tequila.
That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a
machine drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything.
That would be impressive. Is this proof published?
It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all
computational histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be
short. In the simulation of tequila + brain, people get drunk.
That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts it
because it predicts "everything", including people drink tequila
and don't get drunk.
Yes, but the key is the measure, isn't it. Everett also predicts
that everything consistent with QM happens. Somehow this leads to
a probabilistic account of what to expect. We know the math but we
don't know the reason. You're no doubt bored with my banging on
about Hoyle, but I must say that his is so far the only metaphor
that has ever conveyed to me how something could be both certain
and uncertain depending on one's point of view. So I think it's
far too tricksy to say that comp predicts everything (or Everett,
or eternal inflation for that matter). The key is the measure and
how that measure discriminates between the typical, the unusual,
and the downright weird. Open problem, sure, but hardly an empty
or pointless one.
But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
success. QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol
molecules in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and
THEN invoking the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind
supervenes on material events, it predicts that your ability to do
arithmetic will be impaired by drinking tequila. It will NOT
predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal probability. So
it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure problem. Without
having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just
fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if
computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its
predominating computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively
self-selected by complex subjects, in this case, like ourselves) is
the physics those selfsame subjects observe,
That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post
Bruno says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it).
But to succeed in prediction it is not enough to show that some
world exists in which mind and physics are consistent (that the
physics that mind infers is also the real physics that predicts
effects on the mind). You need also to show this has large measure
relative to contrary worlds. One can make a logic chopping argument
that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be making
sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the whole
computational argument otiose.
I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out
some further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional
expertise in these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine
and consequently any comments you might make would be very helpful.
By the way, it would also be helpful if you would read beyond the
next paragraph before commenting because I hope I will come by
myself to the fly in the ointment.
Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we
are led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical"
computational continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This
of course is also to assume that all such continuations are finitely
computable (i.e. halting).
I don't think they need to halt. They need only to go through our
local state. A priori, the halting computations might have a null
measure among all computations, so that the global "physical" measure
might be determined only by the Non Halting computations. Just a
technical detail out of the scope of your argument, to be sure, but it
might have technical consequences when we do the math though.
Bruno
Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that
our observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is
evidence of its emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the
predominant computational mechanism underlying those very
perceptions. Hence it might seem equally reasonable to conclude that
this is the reason that these latter correspondingly appear to
supervene on concrete physical manifestations in their effective
environment.
Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why
would it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should
predominate in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would
seem that the generator of the set of possible physical computations
is infinitely reiterative​ and hence very robust (both in the sense
of computational inclusiveness a la step 7, and that of internal
self-consistency). But who is to say that the generators of
"magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't equally or
even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a Library of Babel
here and the Vast majority of any such library is bound to be
gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with Feynman's
path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated here). Might a
kind of least action principle be applicable here, such that
internally consistent computations self-reinforce, whereas
inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel?
Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking
here about the evaluation of what we typically remember having
experienced. I can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry).
Subjectively speaking, there's a kind of struggle always in process
between remembering and forgetting. So on the basis suggested above,
and from the abstract point of view of Hoyle's singular agent (or
equally Bruno's virgin machine), inconsistent paths might plausibly
tend to result, in effect, in a net (unintelligible) forgetting and
contrariwise, self-consistent paths might equally plausibly result
in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking of consistent and
hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps you would
substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever
particularly appreciated.
So this is all very general and no doubt hand-wavy, but it's what
occurred to me today whilst reflecting on our present discussion
from the perspective of a sunny cafe on the Sicilian coast (sad,
isn't it?).
David
That's how it is similar to the Boltzmann brain problem. I think
Sean Carroll has solved the Boltzmann brain problem, but there is
still some controversy.
then it must fail. In effect, at that point we would have arrived
at a notion of computation that did indeed appear to supervene on
objects in the effective physical environment, albeit qua
computatio, as Bruno was wont to say. Hence if the physical brain
got plastered, so would the mind apparently supervening on it.
That's true in this world...one among infinitely many.
Brent
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