On 15 Jul 2017, at 06:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/14/2017 7:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I think Brent has commented that consciousness needs a world to be
conscious of -- that doesn't, of itself, constrain that world in
any way. Even more so if the consciousness is a product of
evolution in that world. Evolution cannot produce anything that
contradicts the laws of physics.
One way to see that consciousness and physics are not tightly
constrained is to note that our consciousness seems adapted to
living on a flat Earth in which Newtonian mechanics prevails. The
"laws of physics", as we've presently congratulated ourselves on
inventing, are so far from intuitive that there are endless
arguments over how to interpret them.
John Clark misses this by stopping at UDA step 3 (not included), and
Bruce seems to stop at step 4 (not included).
We, the universal machines, are distributed in an infinity of
(arithmetical) computations below our substitution level on which our
First Person experience is undetermined, and the laws to predict the
observable must be given by a statistic on all computations, or it
needs to invoke some metaphysical entity, be it Matter or God, doing a
magical (non Turing emulable nor FPI recoverable) selection. That
entails a "many computations" view of reality, and the quantum logical
aspect of Nature is intuitively explained already.
Now, why negative amplitude of probability? This remains counter-
intuitive, but is explained by the fact that the statistic are not on
the 3p representational bodies in arithmetic, but on the 1p views,
which necessitate to be defined by machine-self-reference. In that
case, the non intuitive matter features are recovered by the
nonintuitive logic of self-reference and its 1p variants, and indeed,
we get a quantum logic which makes us expect a unique measure. It
obeys, up to now at least, everything needed to have those negative
probability amplitudes, as required.
It is true that we can implement consciousness in a classical machine
(assuming the substitution level enough high) but from its first
person perspective, that machine will still experience the
indeterminacy probabilities on all "classical and non classical"
implementations in arithmetic.
People are stuck on the brain-mind identity brain link, which is not
available when we assume Mechanism. The first person is always
associated with an infinity of implementations. We have to take into
account the 1p/3p distinction. If a machine discovers that it run in a
classical physical setting, the machine we interrogate will act like
she knows that she belongs to a simulation or that computationalism is
false.
I understand that this is shocking, but normally, in this list, people
should be used to it, because they accept Everett and the "everything"
idea which should help them to be prepared for that admittedly
unpleasant self-differentiation/self-multiplication. That is why I
explain mechanism here, as people know already the work of Everett,
and from a physicists standpoint, Mechanism generalizes its embedding
of the subject's body in subject's matter of the theory, something
already begun in arithmetic by Gödel, Kleene, Post, etc.
Bruno
Brent
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