On 15 Jul 2017, at 14:20, David Nyman wrote:
On 15 July 2017 at 09:26, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 15 Jul 2017, at 06:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/14/2017 7:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I think Brent has commented that consciousness needs a world to be
conscious of -- that doesn't, of itself, constrain that world in any
way. Even more so if the consciousness is a product of evolution in
that world. Evolution cannot produce anything that contradicts the
laws of physics.
One way to see that consciousness and physics are not tightly
constrained is to note that our consciousness seems adapted to
living on a flat Earth in which Newtonian mechanics prevails. The
"laws of physics", as we've presently congratulated ourselves on
inventing, are so far from intuitive that there are endless
arguments over how to interpret them.
John Clark misses this by stopping at UDA step 3 (not included), and
Bruce seems to stop at step 4 (not included).
Which particular 'this' do you have in mind here? The
interpretation of the "laws of physics"?
By "this" I meant that consciousness and physics are tightly
constrained. Consciousness, including the observable (Physics) is made
into a branch of machine arithmetical self-reference.
We, the universal machines, are distributed in an infinity of
(arithmetical) computations below our substitution level on which
our First Person experience is undetermined, and the laws to predict
the observable must be given by a statistic on all computations, or
it needs to invoke some metaphysical entity, be it Matter or God,
doing a magical (non Turing emulable nor FPI recoverable) selection.
That entails a "many computations" view of reality, and the quantum
logical aspect of Nature is intuitively explained already.
Now, why negative amplitude of probability?
Not sure I follow. Negative amplitude of probability is
found in harmonical functions, isn't it?
Negative amplitude appears in all wave theory, but only in quantum
mechanics do they have an interpretation in term of amplitude of
probability. The whole "mystery" of quantum mechanics is there.
I was alluding to the rather normal critics asserting that, a priori,
in the UDA, or in classical probability theory, the probabilities on
the next computational continuations are purely additive. There is no
clue why the probabilities could be attached to some which undulate.
But that critics makes a mistake. The probabilities are not on the 3p
computations, but on the 1p experiences brought by those computations.
So, to have the logic obeyed by those probabilities, we have to use a
precise mathematical definition of "first person". This one is
"offered" by the incompleteness theorem which makes sense of
Theaetetus definition (in three different ways, giving three physical
realms).
Those notions of first person makes the antic dream argument valid,
explains entirely consciousness (if we agree to characterize it by the
"non rationally justifiable yet undoubtable truth), associates an
intuitionist subject to the knower, and, the main thing here, a
quantum logic (and thus plausible negative amplitude of probability)
for the observable.
This remains counter-intuitive, but is explained by the fact that
the statistic are not on the 3p representational bodies in
arithmetic, but on the 1p views, which necessitate to be defined by
machine-self-reference. In that case, the non intuitive matter
features are recovered by the nonintuitive logic of self-reference
and its 1p variants, and indeed, we get a quantum logic which makes
us expect a unique measure. It obeys, up to now at least, everything
needed to have those negative probability amplitudes, as
required. It is true that we can implement consciousness in a
classical machine (assuming the substitution level enough high) but
from its first person perspective, that machine will still
experience the indeterminacy probabilities on all "classical and non
classical" implementations in arithmetic.
People are stuck on the brain-mind identity brain link, which is not
available when we assume Mechanism. The first person is always
associated with an infinity of implementations. We have to take into
account the 1p/3p distinction. If a machine discovers that it run in
a classical physical setting, the machine we interrogate will act
like she knows that she belongs to a simulation or that
computationalism is false.
I understand that this is shocking, but normally, in this list,
people should be used to it, because they accept Everett and the
"everything" idea which should help them to be prepared for that
admittedly unpleasant self-differentiation/self-multiplication. That
is why I explain mechanism here, as people know already the work of
Everett, and from a physicists standpoint, Mechanism generalizes its
embedding of the subject's body in subject's matter of the theory,
something already begun in arithmetic by Gödel, Kleene, Post, etc.
Not only that, at first blush it looks as if it reverses entirely
the explanatory priority from mechanism-->mind to mind-->mechanism.
But perhaps in fact it creates a symmetry between the two modes of
explanation.
To get the full symmetry, I think we need to accept the idea that all
"virgin" universal machine are "maximally conscious". In that case,
the "cosmic consciousness" (as some call it) is the consciousness of
the universal person (attached to the universal machine) and the
arithmetical truth (which can be limited to the sigma_1 arithmetical
truth when we interview the computationalist universal machine).
What I mean is that if we were to simply accept mechanism on its own
terms, without extrapolating to mind, then we would have an
'explanation' entirely in itself, or rather a machine that proceeds
of itself without further need of explanation.
But Mechanism is defined with the notion of consciousness. It is the
belief that "I" remain conscious through a digital brain transplant.
For example, if we conceive physics as such a mechanism, the
physical machine proceeds from state to state without the need of
invoking mind, or for that matter worlds, creatures, biological
evolution, or all the other mentalistic paraphernalia. On the other
hand, should we be 'minded' to accept mind on its own terms, we are
at once at a loss for a mechanism for the phenomena that undoubtedly
appear within its observational spectra. As a slogan, we might
assert that (from an explanatory perspective) mechanism has no need
for a mind, but mind is in dire need of a mechanism. This, if you
like, supplies a rationale for why we look for such a mechanism and
feel justified in deploying observational self-selection as the
filter on the generalised mechanistic base. Having done so, we find
ourselves left with the explanatory or implicative symmetry mind<--
>mechanism.
OK. You were using "mechanism" in the pure 3p sense (not in the
Digital Mechanism theological act of faith of a candidate for
classical teleportation). In that case, we need only arithmetic and
Church's thesis. With Church's thesis, it is a theorem already of
Peano Arithmetic that all computations are executed by the
arithmetical reality. But to associate consciousness and 1p experience
(and not just the 3p account of those experiences) we need the
theological assumption, and then we get the mean to explain the
illusion of physical laws and why they can last for "long period".
The mechanism for mind is the conjunction of the representational
beliefs (well captured by the beweisbar box) and the semantics or
truth, not capturable at all by the machine (except at the metalevel
by doing the explicit mechanist hypothesis). This explains the sound
feeling that consciousness is not explainable in any 3p way (which is
correct), yet lived by the machine (if defined or characterized by
undoubtable and non "scientifically" communicable). The machine can
explain why they have to be at lost when relating their consciousness
and any 3p account of it: that simply does not exist. But the price is
high, because to solve the mind body problem with this explanation of
the mind, the entire physics must be a theorem of (meta)arithmetic, as
I hope one of S4Grz1, X1* and Z1* will show (and seem to promise to
show).
Bruno
David
Bruno
Brent
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