On 16 Jul 2017, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 16, 2017 at 3:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> I don't know about Bruce but what John Clark missed is
reading dumb stuff, and that's a good thing because life is too
short for that, especially in something that claims to be as
rigorous as any mathematical proof. Treating a personal
pronoun as if it is a unique object in the universe immediately
after a personal pronoun duplicating machine is introduced that
can crank them out like hotcakes is just dumb. And so is the
idea that the success or failure of a prediction has
something to do with the subjective feeling of self.
> i don't see any ambiguity, given that we have agreed to
define the first person use of the pronoun and the third person use
of them. A first person, in this setting, is defined by the memory
of its experience
But that other fellow over there has the exact same memories as
you do, so which one is you?
In the 3p description, obviously, both are you (with the definition of
which we have agreed).
In the 1p description, both feel to be only one among the two, as both
confirm.
Oh oh I know, the one that has THE 1p. And which one has THE 1p?
The one that is you of course. Who can see any ambiguity in
something like that?
It's easy to prove that there is something about the conscious
experience that matter can't duplicate if in the very beginning of
the proof an assumption is made that there is something about the
conscious experience that matter can't duplicate.
> (or the content of the diary brought in the teleportation
box).
Ah, then wouldn't that diary also be duplicated?
Exactly. That *is* the key point. They are duplicated, but each
reconstituted person has, obviously, direct access to one copy, not
both.
Bruno
> That is enough to eliminate all ambiguities.
Right, the peepee protocol permanently prevents
pernicious peculiar paradoxes.
John K Clark
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