On Sun, Jul 16, 2017 at 3:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

​>> ​
>> I don't know about Bruce but what John Clark missed is reading dumb
>> stuff, and that's a good thing because life is too short for that,
>> especially in something that claims to be as rigorous
>> ​ ​
>> as any
>> ​ ​
>> mathematical proof. Treating a personal pronoun as if it is a unique
>> object in the universe immediately after a personal pronoun duplicating
>> machine is
>> ​ ​
>> introduced that can crank them
>> ​ ​
>> out like hotcakes is just dumb. And so is the idea that
>> ​ ​
>> the success or
>> ​ ​
>> failure of a prediction has something to do with the subjective feeling
>> of self.
>
>
> ​> ​
> i don't see any ambiguity, given that we have agreed to define the first
> person use of the pronoun and the third person use of them. A first person,
> in this setting, is defined by the memory of its experience
>

​But that other fellow over there has the exact same memories as you do, so
which one is you?​

​Oh oh I know, the one that has *THE* 1p. And which one has *THE* 1p? The
one that is you of course. Who can see any ambiguity in something like that?

It's easy to prove that there is something about the conscious experience
that matter can't duplicate if in the very beginning of the proof an
assumption is made t
hat there is something about the conscious experience that matter can't
duplicate
​.​


> ​> ​
> (or the content of the diary brought in the teleportation box).
>

​Ah, then wouldn't ​that diary also be duplicated?



> ​> ​
> That is enough to eliminate all ambiguities.
>

​Right, ​t
he peepee ​protocol permanently prevents pernicious
​peculiar paradoxes.

John K Clark

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