On 17 Jul 2017, at 18:19, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 5:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> that other fellow over there has the exact same memories
as you do, so which one is you?
> In the 3p description, obviously, both are you
In any description as far as I can tell.
Obviously not. From the 1p view of each copies, as you have already
agreed, they have differentiated. They each got one bit of
information. One wrote "my personal current experience is seeing
Moscow, and from what I know, it is conceivable that the copy in
Washington has not yet been reconstituted". The other wrote "my
personal current experience is seeing Washington, and from what I
know, it is conceivable that the copy in Moscow has not yet been
reconstituted".
> In the 1p description, both feel to be only one among the two,
Then "the 1p description" cannot distinguish between the two.
? Perhaps. It is ambiguous.
Therefore it is not a description at all.
It is an experience. The one which is the subject of any theory of
consciousness. Assuming Mechanism gives not much choice, in this
situation, to predict what machine would say after a duplication, and
indeed they cannot "feel the split", but, obviously, us, from the 3p
can see that there has been a split. And if the machine has enough
cognitive ability (as much as PA), she can understand that IF she
survives simple teleportation, then she cannot feel the split in a
duplication experience, nor predict the poutcome of the self-
localization, etc.
Therefore it is a useless dead end and a complete waste of time.
It is unavoidable to understand the impact of the Mechanist assumption
(in the cognitive science) in Metaphysics. Digital Mechanism is
epistemologically inconsistent with physicalism. The laws of physics
have an (arithmetical) reason.
> as both confirm.
All they confirm is that they are both you.
?
They confirm indeed they are both the H-guy, but they confirmed also
that now, they have differentiated, and continue to live different
experiences, one in Moscow, and one in Washington. If they come back
together, they will have to find social mode. Can your doppelganger do
love with the woman you just met in Washington?
In fact, I find amusing that when asked, some people seem to dislike a
lot the idea of meeting their doppelganger, and some love the idea.
The trouble with "the 1-p description" is that there is no
description in "the 1-p description".
No. That is the solution. That is common with consciousness, but even
with the notion of knowledge, and in fact a common thread to all
experiences. And what is common, is the relation they have with truth.
The qualia, conscious part of the experience, is true, but
unexpressible. It does not have any description. But that is why it is
interesting we have a simple model (persona memory), and then a much
more fertile model: the "true opinion" of Theaetetus, that Gödel's
incompleteness enforces on provability. It, too, will not been
describable by the machine. This, formally solves the qualia problem.
With mechanism, and concerning "simple" sound machine, we can see that
G* proves []p <-> ([]p & p), and that G does not prove it, making it
impossible to believe (justify rationally) its assumption of Digital
Mechanism.
>> wouldn't that diary also be duplicated?
> Exactly. That *is* the key point. They are duplicated, but
each reconstituted person has, obviously, direct access to one copy,
not both.
But if both are identical what on earth can it mean to have access
to one but not the other? If there are 2 copies of Newton's
Principia and I have access to one but not the other how have I
been deprived? What information is unavailable to me?
Just open the door.
The diary is interesting for witnessing the differentiation, once the
door open, you (both of you!) will write "Oh Washington!", or "Oh
Moscow!".
I am not saying that this is true, but that it follows from the
Digital Mechanist assumption. Trivially. The interesting steps are
waiting.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
