On 26 Jul 2017, at 03:26, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
> The 999 who bet A won,
The bet was about who would be "you".
That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption,
we know that all copies will be you.
The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on
which first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no
ambiguity) will live in the future (it exists as we assume
computationalism).
For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you
will drink a cup of coffee (offered at both places), you can bet in
Helsinki that whatever happen you will survive from your first person
point of view in ONE city, as this happens, like the coffee, in both
place.
So, in Helsinki, you know with certainty (assuming mechanism and the
protocol) that you will survive in ONE city, and for obvious reason
you cannot predict which one, as mechanism shows that if you predict a
precise city, the copies will refute it.
It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
So now 999 people are "you"? I'm OK with that use of the word in a
world with "you" duplicating machines, but I'm surprised anybody
else on this list is, and I still don't understand why Mr.B didn't
win too.
He win too, but he is in minority.
Suppose QM-without-collapse, and that you look at a cat in the state
sqrt(999/1000) alive + sqrt(1/1000) dead. What will you bet? Well the
QM formalism says that you should bet on cat-alive, as the proba is
999/1000. The guy who bet on "cat-dead" does not disappear though, and
certainly win in one world among 1000, but he is less numerous in the
many-worlds structures.
By allowing more than one person going in the read-and-cut-box, you
can see that if they bet where they will find themselves, gain will be
maximize for the majority when they use the FPI.
If your argument where valid, you should conclude that there are no
probabilities in QM-without-collapse. The fact that the copies cannot
met is not relevant for the prediction on the immediate first person
experience, and if you really want, just modify the protocol to assure
that the copies will never met. That works in the UDA reasoning,
because in step seven, the FPI are on your copies emulated in
arithmetic, and those too will never met. (And this also shows that if
you "never met" argument is really the root of your problem, by
reading the argument up to step 7, you would have seen the non
relevance of the "never met" argument by yourself.
A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will
be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but
you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will
never differentiated. In that case, there is only two first person
experiences accessible, and the probability remains 1/2 (if not, the
probabilities would depend on the tickness of the axon copies (which
could be merged in Moscow), and that would refute the functionalist
part of computationalism). This plays some role to get a measure on
the first person experience: the probabilities are on the
*differentiating* and thus *distinguishable* experiences.
Bruno
John K Clark
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