On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >>> >> >>> The bet was about who would be "you". >> >> >> > >> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption, we >> know that all copies will be you. >> >> The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on >> which first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no >> ambiguity) will live in the future >> > > > No ambiguity?? If that > is > what "you" means then that's ridiculous squared! The > > "you" > > here In Helsinki now on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated > Universal Time will not exist tomorrow because tomorrow > nobody > who answers by the name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki > , > and even more important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 > Coordinated Universal Time will never come around again. If that's > really > what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people > duplicating machine. But if "you" means somebody who remembers being > Bruno Marchal on > > Wednesday July 26 2017 > at > 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it > could mean, then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines > are involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly > the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no > . > > > > Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure, but > you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where you will > feel to be. > > 3p/1p confusion. > > > > > > > > > > For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you > will drink a cup of coffee > > It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for granted that > people on this list > simply can not stop themselves from using personal pronouns. > > > >> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views. >> > > It's true I am confused. Tell me which *ONE* of those 1001 people has > *THE* 1p view and I will be less confused. > > > > The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From their > first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they all see the > symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON indeterminacy. > > > > > > > A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will be >> duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but you are >> told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never >> differentiated. >> > > Then there are only 2 people not 1000. > > > > Exactly. > > > > > > >> > >> In that case, there is only two first person experiences >> > > Agreed. > > > >> > >> and the probability remains 1/2 >> > > Huh? The probability of what? > > > > The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person point > of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies, confirm this. > Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
