On 27 Jul 2017, at 18:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 8:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> The bet was about who would be "you".
> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist
assumption, we know that all copies will be you. The bet is
not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which
first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no
ambiguity) will live in the future
No ambiguity?? If that is what "you" means then that's
ridiculous squared! The "you" here In Helsinki now on
Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time will
not exist tomorrow because tomorrow nobody who answers by the
name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki, and even more
important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated
Universal Time will never come around again. If that's really
what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a
people duplicating machine. But if "you" means somebody who
remembers being Bruno Marchal on Wednesday July 26 2017
at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what
else it could mean, then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if
duplicating machines are involved "you" could be alive in several
different places at exactly the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no
.
Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure,
but you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where
you will feel to be.
3p/1p confusion.
> For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever
happen, you will drink a cup of coffee
It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for
granted that people on this list simply can not stop
themselves from using personal pronouns.
> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
It's true I am confused. Tell me which ONE of those 1001 people
has THE 1p view and I will be less confused.
The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From
their first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they
all see the symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON
indeterminacy.
A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you
will be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in
Moscow, but you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally
identical, and will never differentiated.
Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
Exactly.
> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
Agreed.
> and the probability remains 1/2
Huh? The probability of what?
The probability of ending living in Washington from the first
person point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000
bodies, confirm this.
Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000
times as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
Consider a computer, C, implemented with a boolean graph, so there
are wires, + NAND, say.
Imagine we double each wires and gates, in a ways such that they
don't touch. That gives a new computer functionally equivalent with
C, having perhaps less thin wires than C. But that gives also a
duplication of C, even if quite close together.
If you are right, then, in the duplication experience, if in Moscow
they use thick wires, and in Washington thin wires, the probabilty
P(M) will be bigger than P(W). Yet, they are both digitally and
functionally (at the right level) equivalent.
Two circuits tied together is electrically equivalent to one circuit
with thicker wires, but two equivalent look ent but separate
circuits us not. The difference is that in the two separate circuits
a different input to each would give a different output, but not in
the connected circuits.
That is possible, but seems to me a bit arbitrary. What if the solid
wire contains some number of isolated wires for reason of security by
rendundance, and the doctor is not aware of this (as it should be as
it is functionally equivalent and just a question of hardware)?
So I have some doubt that your answer is coherent with the mechanist
hypothesis.
The probabilities are always about the first person experiences.
They do not need to be distinct, though, but there need to be
distinguishable in principle, and it is hard to imagine protocol to
capture this. It is about the point where I move to the math theory
of self-reference.
In the multiverse there are many identical implementations of
quotidian first person experiences for each bizarre experience such
as quantum tunneling to the other side of the Earth. How would we
explain the probability of the bizarre experience being much less if
the quotidian experiences are aggregated and carry no more weight in
the calculation?
Because they are not "aggregated" for ever. The weight come from their
future self-distinction. It is related to the Y = II rule. A
bifurcation or differentiation in the "future", in the UD*, adds
weight to past experiences. But this is in arithmetic or in the
generic UD*: the "multiverse" emerge from this, with its own internal
indexical time, not directly related to the "Y = II" which occurs in
the "arithmetical timing, and sub-timing" of the Universal Dovetailing.
Also, what is P(M) and P(W) in case you are told (in Helsinki) that
they will build two identical reconstitutions in Moscow, evolving
identically for a period of time, and then fuse them, to get one
more solid computer?
A later event should not affect the initial probability calculation.
It never does that in the emerging physical timing, plausibly, but it
makes the probabilities interfering (like in QM: the "parallel
universe" does not interact, but modifies the statistical
interference. With the Y = II rule, the probability = 1/2 in Helsinki
in some local sense, but if the guy in Moscow decide de duplicate
himself in distinguishable copies in Moscow, eventually, that
probability needs to be revised.
Normally, at step 4, which is the WM-duplication of step 3, but with a
large delay for the reconstitution in Moscow. People seems OK that
this does not change the P=1/2, but you see there that a decision
taken much later in Moscow modify the probability in Helsinki.
It does get complicated, though: what if splitting or fusing occurs
a millisecond after duplication? What if there is one copy which is
99% accurate in Moscow and 1000 copies which are 10% accurate in
Washington? Intuition fails here.
Yes, and that is why the thought experiment which motivates/justifies
the reversal qualitatively must at some point be treated
mathematically to get right the more quantitative characters, and that
is why I interview directly the universal (Gödel-Löbian entity). We
get the quantum logic and the quantizations, which is either a
miraculous coincidence or a sign this could work. It is a difficult
mathematical problem to derive the (necessarily unique) measure from
this. In the everett-view of quantum field theory, the physicists
encounter very similar difficulties, notably with the spo-called
virtual particles and sum on an infinity of histories, where a photon
can split into an electron and positron and fuse quickly after. The
real probabilities with all decimals exact needs all amplitudes of all
events be taken into account. The real probabilities in step 3 would
need to counts the (amplitude) of probabilities of "aberrant or
complex" sub-histories, including the probability that the guys in
Moscow and Washington undergo duplications.
I will come back to the interview of the machine soon or later. I
currently think that the best exposition remains the original paper(s)
by Gödel, like his 1931 and 1934 papers (which can be found in Davis
Dover book "the undecidable").
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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