On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> The bet was about who would be "you".
> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist
assumption, we know that all copies will be you. The bet is not
on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which first
person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no ambiguity)
will live in the future
No ambiguity?? If that is what "you" means then that's
ridiculous squared! The "you" here In Helsinki now on
Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time will
not exist tomorrow because tomorrow nobody who answers by the
name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki, and even more important
because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time
will never come around again. If that's really what "you" means
then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people duplicating
machine. But if "you" means somebody who remembers being Bruno
Marchal on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated
Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it could mean, then
"you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines are
involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly
the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no.
Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure,
but you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where you
will feel to be.
3p/1p confusion.
> For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever
happen, you will drink a cup of coffee
It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for
granted that people on this list simply can not stop themselves
from using personal pronouns.
> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
It's true I am confused. Tell me which ONE of those 1001 people
has THE 1p view and I will be less confused.
The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From their
first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they all see
the symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON indeterminacy.
A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will
be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow,
but you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical,
and will never differentiated.
Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
Exactly.
> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
Agreed.
> and the probability remains 1/2
Huh? The probability of what?
The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person
point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies,
confirm this.
Bruno
John K Clark
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