On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> The bet was about who would be "you".
> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist
assumption, we know that all copies will be you. The bet is
not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which
first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no
ambiguity) will live in the future
No ambiguity?? If that is what "you" means then that's
ridiculous squared! The "you" here In Helsinki now on
Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time will
not exist tomorrow because tomorrow nobody who answers by the
name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki, and even more
important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated
Universal Time will never come around again. If that's really
what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a
people duplicating machine. But if "you" means somebody who
remembers being Bruno Marchal on Wednesday July 26 2017 at
17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else
it could mean, then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if
duplicating machines are involved "you" could be alive in several
different places at exactly the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no
.
Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure,
but you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where
you will feel to be.
3p/1p confusion.
> For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever
happen, you will drink a cup of coffee
It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for
granted that people on this list simply can not stop
themselves from using personal pronouns.
> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
It's true I am confused. Tell me which ONE of those 1001 people
has THE 1p view and I will be less confused.
The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From
their first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they
all see the symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON
indeterminacy.
A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you
will be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in
Moscow, but you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally
identical, and will never differentiated.
Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
Exactly.
> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
Agreed.
> and the probability remains 1/2
Huh? The probability of what?
The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person
point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies,
confirm this.
Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000
times as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
Consider a computer, C, implemented with a boolean graph, so there are
wires, + NAND, say.
Imagine we double each wires and gates, in a ways such that they don't
touch. That gives a new computer functionally equivalent with C,
having perhaps less thin wires than C. But that gives also a
duplication of C, even if quite close together.
If you are right, then, in the duplication experience, if in Moscow
they use thick wires, and in Washington thin wires, the probabilty
P(M) will be bigger than P(W). Yet, they are both digitally and
functionally (at the right level) equivalent.
So I have some doubt that your answer is coherent with the mechanist
hypothesis.
The probabilities are always about the first person experiences. They
do not need to be distinct, though, but there need to be
distinguishable in principle, and it is hard to imagine protocol to
capture this. It is about the point where I move to the math theory of
self-reference.
Also, what is P(M) and P(W) in case you are told (in Helsinki) that
they will build two identical reconstitutions in Moscow, evolving
identically for a period of time, and then fuse them, to get one more
solid computer?
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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