On 01 Aug 2017, at 18:25, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> After the experience is done they STILL can't
give any more precise information.
> Correct. That is the incommunicability, or unprovability that
we can survive (any experience). But we are working in the
computationalist frame, where we accept that we surivive,
independently that it is unprovable.
A prediction means stating something now that will be known with
certainty in the future, if that something is not known now
Like "I got HEAD", or "I got FACE", in the coin experience. Before, I
predict "HEAD v FACE", even P(HEAD) = P(FACE) = 1/2.
Like "I see Washington", or "I see Moscow" in the WM-duplication. Same
prediction as above.
and is not known in the future
Not known by who?
The question is on the first person experience which will be lived. As
the first person is duplicated, (in the 3-1 view), and as the question
is on the experiences, we have to ask both copies, and both confirms
that "W v M" was correct, and P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is reasonable for
reason of digital identity.
The result has been known in the future by the first person(s)
involved. All copies confirm that now, they know the outcome of the
experience, and also, that they could not have predicted it in advance.
They know that in the 2-iteration, the best prediction is, with 0 and
1 in place of W and M for reason of readability:
00 v 01 v 10 v 11.
In the n-iteration, it can be proved that the majority of copies will
have a non-compressible sequence in their personal diary, which shows
that digital mechanism entails a strong form of indeterminacy (in the
first person perspective, and that is why it is called first person
indeterminacy).
It is cool, because for an outsider, never entering in the box, and
looking at all this, there is no indeterminacy at all.
There is nothing paradoxical, as long as we distinguish the 1p and 3p
discourses.
either then the failure to know it now is not a failure of
prediction. There is simply nothing there to know.
There is nothing to know in the third person perspective, but the
question was on the unique first person experience that anyone can
live in a self-multiplication scenario (unless you think that you die
in such process, if not you will a unique personal experience, so that
you can evaluate expectations).
> I can predict that a coin will fall on HEAD or on TAIL with
certainty
In retrospect you can do much better than that, you can say "I
should have said the coin will fall on TAILS with 100% certainty";
but even in retrospect there is no correct answer to the question
"what one and only one city will I end up in?". And that fact
means it wasn't a question at all.
You eliminate the subjective experience of both copies. You persist in
never listening to what they say.
What should answer the John-Clark with the following WM-histories,
when trying what they will write next?
011001001000011101101101010100010001000010110100011000010
111011011011100001010100010110001010001010111011010010100
?
Bruno
John K Clark
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