On 10 Sep 2017, at 08:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 10/09/2017 6:17 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Sep 2017, at 01:23, Russell Standish wrote:
You have to keep in mind that my theory is a model - the bitstrings
are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient. They represent the
data
interpreted by an observer. Something like a universal dovetailer
gives us the bitstrings by virtue of the Washington-Moscow thought
experiment.
?
The iterated self-duplication gives all bitstrings.
The universal dovetailer, or the sigma_1 completeness, by the non
triviality of what is a universal machine/number and what they can
prove and bet on, we better hope not getting all bitstrings, which
with mechanism with white noise.
I think Russell is right in that the dovetailer necessarily gives
all possible bitstrings.
Yes, but only by the FPI. What makes the differences and the different
internal sense is provided by the Universal number/machine.
I will prefer to not assumes any infinities in the ontology,
especially a non enumerable one. They will not disappear, but appears
as mind tools phenomenologies.
This is Russell's Plenitude - the 'Nothing' since all possible
bitstrings convey no information. It is white noise from the outside
(if there were any such thing as an 'outside'), but the only strings
that are relevant to our consciousness are the ones that are
conscious, and these self-select. Some of the others might give rise
to completely different worlds, with completely different types of
consciousness, but we do not necessarily interact with those (there
might not be a white rabbit problem).
Not sure. Russell mention an Occam catastrophe. But all this is too
vague to formulate precisely the measure problem, and solve it
rigorously, even if Russell at least see the problem, and try to
tackle it.
But, a bit like the physicalist, it looks like the observer is just
some point getting the data, where mechanism reminds us that the
observer has a (dreaming) brain, which is at the least a Turing
universal device, which can help to translate the problem in arithmetic.
As I see it, the conscious strings themselves contain all the
information necessary to construct a world -- they are self-
contained time capsules, or something of that sort. It is not a
consciousness in isolation, but an embodied consciousness. No other
type of bitstring is conscious in the necessary sense.
A bit string cannot be conscious, nor anything 3p describable. The
problem is whatever you take as elementary existing, how to relate the
first person points of view. With incompleteness, the oldest trick
functions (Theatetus: you link the believer with the truth).
Bruno
I like Russell's idea that the map-territory distinction breaks down
if the description (map) is completely detailed so that the
territory does not contain any additional information. The the map
becomes the territory, and the distinction is a distinction without
a difference. So the descriptions contained in the infiinitude of
bitstrings constitute the actual reality of consciousness and the
world.
As I said a while back, this might be the case, and we have
recovered both consciousness and the world, but we have 'explained'
neither: an unfortunate feature of theories that contain everything
(eveythingism!).
Bruce
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