On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 7:35 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > > >>> >> >>> The expectations of what will happen will change from person to person, >>> but the reality of what actually did happen will not. >>> >> >> > >> The reality of what actually does happen is not available to anyone in >> the thought experiment, >> > > The reality of who does or does not have the memories of being the > Helsinki man yesterday Is > available > to anyone by simply asking the Moscow man and the Washington man about > things the Helsinki man knew. > Yes, I probably could have stated my point better. Which is: the reality of what happens to all the copies is not available to any one copy. The only reality available to a copy is the contents of their own mind. > > > >>>> >> >>>> t >>>> o open their eyes to a single city. >>> >>> >>> >> >>> If he's a fool he might indeed expect that, but I don't much care what >>> fools think. But ask yourself this, how many fools tomorrow will remember >>> being asked the question today? I maintain the answer is 2 fools not one. >>> Do you disagree? >>> >> >> > >> It's irrelevant. >> > > It's not irrelevant if the survival of the Helsinki man means somebody > today remembers being the Helsinki man yesterday; and I can't imagine what > else the survival of the Helsinki man could mean. > > What I'm saying is irrelevant is how many copies are actually created. Nothing you said there makes that relevant. The survival of Helsinki man is dependent only on at least one copy being made. > > > >> The actual number of copies is irrelevant to the thought experiment, as >> long as it's more than one. >> > > If there is more than one then it would be very foolish to ask "what one > and only one thing will *you* see after *you* become two?". And that's why > the thought experiment is worthless. > > I'm not asking that. > > >> before you enter the duplicator, what do you (the Helsinki you) expect to >> experience? >> > > I just don't get it! Why do you care what some jackass expects today but > don't care who will remembers being that jackass tomorrow? > > I didn't say I don't care who remembers being Helsinki man. > > > >> Consider one's experience before entering the duplicator, and the >> experience after. Follow the stream of consciousness, as if you were the >> one entering the duplicator, >> > > I don't know how to follow "*THE"* > stream of consciousness > and don't even know what it means because there are two not one. > No, there is only one, even if there are infinite diverging copies. You agreed earlier that you cannot experience more than one city at the same time. Any other minds in other cities are not accessible to a copy. This is the view from inside, the inner experience. There is only ever one of them. You know this to be true: you may behave *as if* others are conscious, but you only ever know for sure that one person is conscious. But I know what you mean. You're talking about the objective view, the view from nowhere. That view is irrelevant to the thought experiment, because we cannot know from that view who is conscious and who isn't. It is possible, for example, that the duplication procedure produces zombies with probability *p*. > > >> > >> what happens on the other side? >> > > John Clark will be in two cities on the other side, if you don't believe > me then go to the two cities and see if there is anybody in them named John > Clark. > I believe you. Well, I believe that two people will say that they are John Clark, but I won't have a clue if they are actually conscious or not. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
