> On 27 Dec 2017, at 17:56, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > Computationalism is the idea that the brain is an information processing > system and that a computer can perform all the complex behaviors that > would be called intelligent if it were done by a human;
That is a weak behaviouristic version of computationalism, in the same sense of the weak AI thesis. It is not the sense used in this list, which is the idea that our consciousness would be preserved if, say, little daemons would replace pieces by pieces our brain our body by digital devices. OK. Let us given it a name: indexical computationalism, in the sense “I" say “yes” to the doctor after having read the sum up of the protocol involved of the digital brain transplant. The metaphysical, or psychological thesis is that “the guy is correct” (which will be a deeply absolutely undecidable proposition, if “indexical mechanism” is consistent. The main difference is that indexical computationalism involves the notion of consciousness. Consciousness can be axiomatically characterised by something which is, for the first person point of view of some entity, true, non-doubtable, not definable, not rationally justifiable. In that case indexical mechanism leads to the “theology of the machine”: it is the science + the truth about the machine that the machine cannot rationnally justifiable, and among them are the “obvious” from the first person point of view, like the <>t for the subject (S4Grz), and not 3p-communicable, like the <>t of the reasoner. > computationalism does NOT insist that everything is information processing > (although it does not rule out that possibility). Both weak comp and indexical comp rule out that everything is information processing, almost trivially as far as arithmetic is concerned. The computable (sigma_0) and the semi-computable (sigma_1) are but a tiny part of truth, and in “real life”, the first person related to the universal numbers are confronted as much with the computable than the non computable part of the reality (by the First-Person-Indeterminacy) > If an AI is made that is as smart or smarter than humans then we'll know > it's right, if that proved to be impossible then we'll know computationalism > is wrong. > > Most of the things on your list, although very interesting in themselves, are > irrelevant as far as the truth or falsehood of computationalism is > concerned. For example, maybe we can't make perfect predictions of what > physical systems will do because an infinite number of calculations would > be needed and that would be impossible, or maybe a finite but astronomically > large number of calculations would be needed and that would be impractical, > or maybe calculations have nothing to do with it and some effects have no > cause and true randomness exists; it doesn't matter because for whatever > reason the fact remains that the human mind can't predict with perfect > precision what a physical system will do. > > And computationalism has a lot to say about intelligent behavior but it > has nothing to say about consciousness, no scientific theory does because > we all only have direct access to one conscious being and good science > can't be done with just one data point, and any argument in support of > the proposition that a computer that behaves intelligently is not conscious > could also be used in support of the proposition that none of our fellow > intelligent behaving human beings are conscious. If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is not much a matter of choice. The physical reality is given by a first person plural reality emerging from complex compromises between truth and all universal numbers. The measure one, on which we hope some day people get the equivalent of Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by []p & <>t (& p) with p sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) where expected. Nature confirms indexical comp, and indexical QM (we could rename also, then). Note that when we interview the universal (Löbian) machine/number, we use only weak computationalism. Bruno > > John K Clark > ============================================================ > > > On Wed, Dec 27, 2017 at 2:18 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known to > date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been falsified so > far. I was hoping with this post to gather a complete list of those tests. > What things in physics would disprove computationalism, and what tests has it > passed so far? Below I try to collect a complete list from memory but it may > be faulty. I ask that others might add to this list or correct things I have > gotten wrong: > > Tests and statuses of each test: > Non-emulability of physical laws > Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat confirmed > <https://phys.org/news/2015-03-einstein-scientists-spacetime-foam.html>) > Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly confirmed > <https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/222858/feynmans-question-on-the-mathematical-machinery-underlying-nature>) > Quantum Mechanics > Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete knowledge > about environment) --- (confirmed > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle>) > Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy>, explanation for being > an "appearance only" i.e. first person indeterminancy vs. fundamental > randomness is made is plausible > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation>) > Born Rule? > Quantization of Energy? > Unitarity > General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by computationalism, and > could use some more help on these) > Linearity of physical laws? > Time reversibility? > Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox) > Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekenstein_bound>) > Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle>) > Existence of a "Time" dimension? > Consciousness > Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ? > Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of experience)? > Are there other things I am missing? If any of the items I have included are > incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and further insight. > > Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently unconfirmed, > as this would lead to predictions which could later be tested and lead to a > refutation of computationalism (or if passed, yield further evidence for > computationalism). > > Jason > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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