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On 2/23/2018 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Feb 2018, at 23:17, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 2/22/2018 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 Feb 2018, at 00:48, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 2/18/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is notmuch a matter of choice.But that's simply assuming what is to be argued.?It is the working hypothesis. The argument is in showing that thisenforces Plato and refutes Aristotle. Physics becomes a branch ofmachine’s psychology or theology.The argument must be that the doctor has done this before (maybe tohumans, maybe to mice) and there was not detectable change inbehavior, so it's reasonable to bet on the doctor.The reason why you say “yes” to the doctor is private. It needs anact of faith because no experience at all can confirm Computationalism.That's moving the goal post. You can't convince me that if you knewthe doctor's work had no observable affect on the behavior of mice ifwould not, for you, count as evidence in favor of consciousness beingretained. Nothing is ever "confirmed" with certainty.My point was stronger. Even if I say yes and truly survive “100%”,that cannot count as a proof that I have survived integrally, Thereason is the possibility of anosognosia.And the point is a theorem in the computationalist metaphysics. Weknow that we would believe correctly to have survived (and thus knowit in the Theaetetical sense), but with an intellectual doubtenforcing to not claim to have *necessarily*survive, keeping thetheological act of faith mandatory. Of course, we can bet that thehumans will forget this ...

`Maybe stronger, but still a very weak point. Everyone on this list`

`thinks that intelligent behavior is an indicator of consciousness; no`

`doubt because they believe that their own consciousness is important in`

`their intelligent behavior. Sure it's possible that they are unrelated`

`and it's just a coincidence or the consciousness is an otiose`

`epiphenomenon. But that doesn't mean it's not evidence...and pretty`

`convincing evidence at that. You have become so immersed in logic and`

`mathematics that you seem to have forgotten that science doesn't find`

`*necessary* truths and that acting on evidence is not an act of faith`

`but of reason.`

Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplantexperience oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despitethe feeling). You can know that you have survived, but you cannotknow for sure that you have survived integrally (but you can knowthat in the Theoretical sense, slightly weakened).A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that sciencehas proven we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man.Not at all. He may be going on the best available evidence. Justbecause it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it hasno credence.Of course. Computationalism just insist that in all case, it asks forthe act of faith.

`If it's based on all the evidence it ain't faith. "Faith is believing`

`what you know ain't so."...Mark Twain.`

Obviously, we have to do that every seconds, if we assume mechanism.The credence can be very high/ My point is more academical, if youwant, no matter how I feel after the transplantation, it is never a“proof” that mechanism is correct, or that I have survived. Like Icannot prove that I am conscious.

`You cannot prove any fact. You can only prove that some axioms entail`

`some theorems given some rules of inference. But you can have evidence,`

`you can test theories. To say it is never proof is trivial.`

Brent

The physical reality is given by a first person plural realityemerging from complex compromises between truth and all universalnumbers. The measure one, on which we hope some day people get theequivalent of Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by []p & <>t(& p) with p sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) whereexpected. Nature confirms indexical comp, and indexical QM (wecould rename also, then).This is based on Kripke semantics, but I have not understood whyits axioms do not include that a world is necessarily accessiblefrom itself?All modal logic which have the axiom k ([](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)),and is close for the necessitation rule (p / []p) admits a Kripkesemantics, and vice versa. The theory K has only k as axiom. A modalframe respect []p -> p if and only if each worlds is accessible toitself (a frame respect a formula means that the formula is true inall worlds, for all valuations of the atomic sentences). But []p ->p is not validate in the model with one world, with p false in thatworld, and having no accessibility arrow. So []p -> p is not validin an arbitrary Kripke model, and []p -> p is not a theorem of K.That is nice, because the logic of provability (G) has cul-de-sacworld (in which []# is always valid trivially, for any #, and suchworld do not access to themselves), and so []p -> p is not atheorem, and the relation cannot be reflexive. That []p -> p is notvalid in the provability logic is immediate if you think to thearithmetical interpretation. []f -> f, i.e. ~[]f , i.e. <>t, i.e.consistency, would be provable, contrary to what the secondincompleteness says. Or show that if we have []p -> p (as theorem),you can easily show that the Löb’s formula ([]([]p -> p) -> []p),would entail a contradiction:[]f -> f. (Let us assume we can prove that) []([]f -> f). (By necessitation) []([]f -> f) -> []f. (By Löb) []f (modus ponens on second and third lines) f (modus ponens on first and preceding line) BrunoOK, thanks.Welcome! BrunoBrent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, sendan email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

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