On 2/23/2018 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2018, at 23:17, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/22/2018 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2018, at 00:48, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/18/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is not
much a matter of choice.
But that's simply assuming what is to be argued.
?
It is the working hypothesis. The argument is in showing that this
enforces Plato and refutes Aristotle. Physics becomes a branch of
machine’s psychology or theology.
The argument must be that the doctor has done this before (maybe to
humans, maybe to mice) and there was not detectable change in
behavior, so it's reasonable to bet on the doctor.
The reason why you say “yes” to the doctor is private. It needs an
act of faith because no experience at all can confirm Computationalism.
That's moving the goal post. You can't convince me that if you knew
the doctor's work had no observable affect on the behavior of mice if
would not, for you, count as evidence in favor of consciousness being
retained. Nothing is ever "confirmed" with certainty.
My point was stronger. Even if I say yes and truly survive “100%”,
that cannot count as a proof that I have survived integrally, The
reason is the possibility of anosognosia.
And the point is a theorem in the computationalist metaphysics. We
know that we would believe correctly to have survived (and thus know
it in the Theaetetical sense), but with an intellectual doubt
enforcing to not claim to have *necessarily*survive, keeping the
theological act of faith mandatory. Of course, we can bet that the
humans will forget this ...
Maybe stronger, but still a very weak point. Everyone on this list
thinks that intelligent behavior is an indicator of consciousness; no
doubt because they believe that their own consciousness is important in
their intelligent behavior. Sure it's possible that they are unrelated
and it's just a coincidence or the consciousness is an otiose
epiphenomenon. But that doesn't mean it's not evidence...and pretty
convincing evidence at that. You have become so immersed in logic and
mathematics that you seem to have forgotten that science doesn't find
*necessary* truths and that acting on evidence is not an act of faith
but of reason.
Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplant
experience oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despite
the feeling). You can know that you have survived, but you cannot
know for sure that you have survived integrally (but you can know
that in the Theoretical sense, slightly weakened).
A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that science
has proven we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man.
Not at all. He may be going on the best available evidence. Just
because it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it has
no credence.
Of course. Computationalism just insist that in all case, it asks for
the act of faith.
If it's based on all the evidence it ain't faith. "Faith is believing
what you know ain't so."...Mark Twain.
Obviously, we have to do that every seconds, if we assume mechanism.
The credence can be very high/ My point is more academical, if you
want, no matter how I feel after the transplantation, it is never a
“proof” that mechanism is correct, or that I have survived. Like I
cannot prove that I am conscious.
You cannot prove any fact. You can only prove that some axioms entail
some theorems given some rules of inference. But you can have evidence,
you can test theories. To say it is never proof is trivial.
Brent
The physical reality is given by a first person plural reality
emerging from complex compromises between truth and all universal
numbers. The measure one, on which we hope some day people get the
equivalent of Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by []p & <>t
(& p) with p sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) where
expected. Nature confirms indexical comp, and indexical QM (we
could rename also, then).
This is based on Kripke semantics, but I have not understood why
its axioms do not include that a world is necessarily accessible
from itself?
All modal logic which have the axiom k ([](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)),
and is close for the necessitation rule (p / []p) admits a Kripke
semantics, and vice versa. The theory K has only k as axiom. A modal
frame respect []p -> p if and only if each worlds is accessible to
itself (a frame respect a formula means that the formula is true in
all worlds, for all valuations of the atomic sentences). But []p ->
p is not validate in the model with one world, with p false in that
world, and having no accessibility arrow. So []p -> p is not valid
in an arbitrary Kripke model, and []p -> p is not a theorem of K.
That is nice, because the logic of provability (G) has cul-de-sac
world (in which []# is always valid trivially, for any #, and such
world do not access to themselves), and so []p -> p is not a
theorem, and the relation cannot be reflexive. That []p -> p is not
valid in the provability logic is immediate if you think to the
arithmetical interpretation. []f -> f, i.e. ~[]f , i.e. <>t, i.e.
consistency, would be provable, contrary to what the second
incompleteness says. Or show that if we have []p -> p (as theorem),
you can easily show that the Löb’s formula ([]([]p -> p) -> []p),
would entail a contradiction:
[]f -> f. (Let us assume we can prove that)
[]([]f -> f). (By necessitation)
[]([]f -> f) -> []f. (By Löb)
[]f (modus ponens on second and third lines)
f (modus ponens on first and preceding line)
Bruno
OK, thanks.
Welcome!
Bruno
Brent
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