> On 23 Feb 2018, at 20:37, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 2/23/2018 12:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 22 Feb 2018, at 23:17, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/22/2018 1:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> On 21 Feb 2018, at 00:48, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/18/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> If consciousness is invariant for a digital transplant, it is not much a >>>>>> matter of choice. >>>>> But that's simply assuming what is to be argued. >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> It is the working hypothesis. The argument is in showing that this >>>> enforces Plato and refutes Aristotle. Physics becomes a branch of >>>> machine’s psychology or theology. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The argument must be that the doctor has done this before (maybe to >>>>> humans, maybe to mice) and there was not detectable change in behavior, >>>>> so it's reasonable to bet on the doctor. >>>> The reason why you say “yes” to the doctor is private. It needs an act of >>>> faith because no experience at all can confirm Computationalism. >>> >>> That's moving the goal post. You can't convince me that if you knew the >>> doctor's work had no observable affect on the behavior of mice if would >>> not, for you, count as evidence in favor of consciousness being retained. >>> Nothing is ever "confirmed" with certainty. >> >> >> My point was stronger. Even if I say yes and truly survive “100%”, that >> cannot count as a proof that I have survived integrally, The reason is the >> possibility of anosognosia. >> And the point is a theorem in the computationalist metaphysics. We know that >> we would believe correctly to have survived (and thus know it in the >> Theaetetical sense), but with an intellectual doubt enforcing to not claim >> to have *necessarily*survive, keeping the theological act of faith >> mandatory. Of course, we can bet that the humans will forget this ... > > Maybe stronger, but still a very weak point. Everyone on this list thinks > that intelligent behavior is an indicator of consciousness;
Yes, but not necessarily an indicator of “supervenient of consciousness in some real time”. If I see a movie, I can see intelligent behaviour, and attribute some consciousness to some person, but not in a real time. With mechanism, the person is always conscious, but its body/representation is not. > no doubt because they believe that their own consciousness is important in > their intelligent behavior. Sure it's possible that they are unrelated and > it's just a coincidence or the consciousness is an otiose epiphenomenon. But > that doesn't mean it's not evidence...and pretty convincing evidence at that. > You have become so immersed in logic and mathematics that you seem to have > forgotten that science doesn't find *necessary* truths and that acting on > evidence is not an act of faith but of reason. When you based your act on reason, you still need some faith in your reason and in its applicability to your local reality. This does not need to be mentioned in most practical application of science, but it becomes important when doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific method. > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> Due to some possible anosognosia, even doing the digital transplant >>>> experience oneself would prove nothing, even to yourself (despite the >>>> feeling). You can know that you have survived, but you cannot know for >>>> sure that you have survived integrally (but you can know that in the >>>> Theoretical sense, slightly weakened). >>>> >>>> A doctor who claim that we survive such transplant, or that science has >>>> proven we can survive such transplant is automatically a con-man. >>> >>> Not at all. He may be going on the best available evidence. Just because >>> it's not proven in your axiomatic system doesn't mean it has no credence. >> >> Of course. Computationalism just insist that in all case, it asks for the >> act of faith. > > If it's based on all the evidence it ain't faith. "Faith is believing what > you know ain't so."...Mark Twain. No, that is blind faith. I use faith for acting from evidence, given that evidence proofs nothing. It is close to the <>t of G, the implicit faith in our own consistency, which makes us inconsistent when made explicit, like with an axiom, postulate or proof. > >> Obviously, we have to do that every seconds, if we assume mechanism. The >> credence can be very high/ My point is more academical, if you want, no >> matter how I feel after the transplantation, it is never a “proof” that >> mechanism is correct, or that I have survived. Like I cannot prove that I am >> conscious. > > You cannot prove any fact. You can only prove that some axioms entail some > theorems given some rules of inference. But you can have evidence, you can > test theories. To say it is never proof is trivial. It is the kind of trivialness that most people forget when doing metaphysics, especially when confusing physics and metaphysics, like the Aristotelian did explicitly at the beginning, but tend to become an habit of thought ever since. Many people have a problem to understand the difficulty of the mind-body problem, because they just confuse the physical science with the metaphysical sciences. They confuse evidence for the a physical reality and physical laws, with evidence for a primary physical evidence. My contribution is in showing that we can test/evaluate the dichotomy between Mechanism and Materialism. And up to now, Mechanism win. As far as we know, the physical reality behaves like it is emerging in the way that digital mechanism makes mandatory. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>>>> The physical reality is given by a first person plural reality emerging >>>>>> from complex compromises between truth and all universal numbers. The >>>>>> measure one, on which we hope some day people get the equivalent of >>>>>> Gleason theorem, i.e. the one provided by []p & <>t (& p) with p >>>>>> sigma_1, obey(s) indeed quantum logic(s) where expected. Nature confirms >>>>>> indexical comp, and indexical QM (we could rename also, then). >>>>> This is based on Kripke semantics, but I have not understood why its >>>>> axioms do not include that a world is necessarily accessible from itself? >>>> All modal logic which have the axiom k ([](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)), and >>>> is close for the necessitation rule (p / []p) admits a Kripke semantics, >>>> and vice versa. The theory K has only k as axiom. A modal frame respect >>>> []p -> p if and only if each worlds is accessible to itself (a frame >>>> respect a formula means that the formula is true in all worlds, for all >>>> valuations of the atomic sentences). But []p -> p is not validate in the >>>> model with one world, with p false in that world, and having no >>>> accessibility arrow. So []p -> p is not valid in an arbitrary Kripke >>>> model, and []p -> p is not a theorem of K. >>>> >>>> That is nice, because the logic of provability (G) has cul-de-sac world >>>> (in which []# is always valid trivially, for any #, and such world do not >>>> access to themselves), and so []p -> p is not a theorem, and the relation >>>> cannot be reflexive. That []p -> p is not valid in the provability logic >>>> is immediate if you think to the arithmetical interpretation. []f -> f, >>>> i.e. ~[]f , i.e. <>t, i.e. consistency, would be provable, contrary to >>>> what the second incompleteness says. Or show that if we have []p -> p (as >>>> theorem), you can easily show that the Löb’s formula ([]([]p -> p) -> >>>> []p), would entail a contradiction: >>>> >>>> []f -> f. (Let us assume we can prove that) >>>> []([]f -> f). (By necessitation) >>>> []([]f -> f) -> []f. (By Löb) >>>> []f (modus ponens on second and third lines) >>>> f (modus ponens on first and preceding line) >>>> >>>> Bruno >>> >>> OK, thanks. >> >> Welcome! >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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